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It can be easily argued that most, if not all, real economic settings are asymmet-
ric in nature. Particularly, it is often the case that one or several agents possess
more or better information than the rest when agreeing upon an economic trans-
action. Although the information economics revolution of the 1970s laid out the
majority of the theoretical foundations, the effects of asymmetric information
are subtle and have not been studied in some very interesting contexts, which
motivate this thesis.
In the first essay, which is based on joint work with Antonio Bento and Ben-
jamin Ho, we study the problem of an uninformed regulator who wishes to use
a voluntary price instrument under varying degrees of uncertainty, specifically
in the context of a carbon offset market. In this scenario, a regulator offers pri-
vate land owners a contract that compensates them for producing carbon offsets
while minimizing adverse selection and welfare losses. The model shows that
monitoring should decrease as the uncertainty of offset quality decreases, but
should increase as uncertainty over agricultural productivity increases. Also, in
response to those who argue that the problem of additionality is so large that
carbon offsets should not be allowed in carbon regulation, the model quantifies
the amount of additionality and finds that even in the case of a regulator with
no information, welfare is improved by allowing offset contracts. Finally, the
model offers guidance for calculating the optimal offset price as a function of
the regulator’s information.
The second essay consists of a cardinal tournament used by a representative
firm to choose its next CEO. Candidates are managers of different types: they
are heterogeneous over levels of ability and risk aversion. The managers have
private information about their ability. In this context, a two-dimensional so-
lution set of levels of ability and risk aversion corresponding to each possible
mean of cash flow realization is identified. Using two different specifications
(CARA preferences with normally distributed cash flows, and CRRA prefer-
ences with log-normally distributed cash flows), the trade-off between manage-
rial ability and risk aversion is found to be characterized by a concave function.
Furthermore, for better levels of technology, the relative importance of risk aver-
sion with respect to ability increases, while for worse levels of technology, the
reverse holds.
Finally, in the third essay, using a model based on the optimal consumption
and investment models from the operations research literature, I study how the
CEO characteristics studied in Chapter 2 impact dividend policy and the long-
run evolution of the firm. Specifically, when assuming CRRA preferences and
a concave trade-off between ability and risk aversion, I find that the optimal
dividend policy of the CEO is non-monotonic with respect to risk aversion. In
other words, CEOs with a combination of both high (or low) ability and risk
aversion, will pay out lower dividend yields than CEOs with a more balanced
combination of ability and risk aversion. Furthermore, firm survival is a func-
tion of the dividend yield and is also non-monotonic: while the probability of
firm survival converges to either zero or one as risk aversion (and, by extension,
ability) converges to either zero or infinity, there exists a range for which lower
investment counteracts a potentially higher dividend yield, and the resulting
change in the probability of survival is ambiguous.
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CHAPTER 1
OPTIMAL PRICE INSTRUMENTS IN VOLUNTARY EMISSION
MARKETS
1.1 Introduction
According to the IPCC, agriculture and deforestation together account for a
quarter of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. However, under
most proposals to cap emissions (such as Kyoto or the Waxman-Markey Bill in
the United States), emissions from sources such as deforestation or agriculture
are not capped. Instead, emissions reductions in these sectors are normally in-
centivized as carbon offset programs where firms receive payments in exchange
for agreements to reduce, i.e., offset, their emissions. Furthermore, a small but
growing part of global climate mitigation efforts is in voluntary offsets markets
which allow individuals or organizations to pay offset originators to make car-
bon reductions in their name. By observing Figures 1.1 and 1.2, from Ecosystem
Marketplace, Bloomberg New Energy Finance, we can appreciate the size and
growth of these markets. Before the “Great Recession” of the late 2000s, pur-
chases of voluntary offsets at least doubled in volume annually, and the value
of these markets grew at an even faster rate. As the global economy recuperates,
that trend, or at least positive growth, is expected to continue for the foreseeable
future.
However, there is still a general distrust of whether the greenhouse gas re-
ductions from offset projects are ”real” and many have expressed concern that
allowing firms in capped sectors to use offsets to reduce their obligations threat-
ens the integrity of cap and trade policies.
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Figure 1.1: Historic Volume Growth of the Voluntary Carbon Offset Markets
Figure 1.2: Historic Value Growth of the Voluntary Carbon Offset Markets
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The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Congressional
Research Service (CRS), among others, have identified permanence, leakage and
additionality (collectively known as PLA) as the primary concerns that threaten
the integrity of carbon offsets:
Permanence: Issues of permanency arise when some carbon reductions (such
as afforestation) may be reversed at some point in the future (e.g., if the
trees get cut down).
Leakage: The problem of leakage occurs when emissions reductions by one
firm or industry indirectly cause emissions from another firm or industry
to inefficiently increase.
Additionality: An offset is said to lack additionality if the carbon reduction
would have happened anyway, without the payments from the offset pur-
chaser.
Together, these three problems undermine the credibility of offsets markets and
highlight the necessity of developing efficient strategies to deal with imperfect
information.
The key insight is that the PLA concerns all arise from the inherent diffi-
cultly in measuring greenhouse gas emissions from sources like agriculture or
deforestation. The difficulties in policy design arise due to asymmetric informa-
tion, in other words, regulators have less accurate information about emissions
than the offset originators. If the uncertainty were symmetric, then mismea-
surements should average out; however, asymmetric information introduces
the possibility of systemic biases. In this paper, we design a model of asymmet-
ric information in which a regulator wishes to design a price instrument in order
3
to incentivize the efficient production of carbon offsets by land owners that have
private information about their heterogeneous characteristics.1 The specific un-
certainties are over the dimensions of land quality (which determines the costs
of emissions reduction) and baseline emissions (which determines the amount
of emission reductions for which firms get credit). The model predicts which
types of firms are most likely to participate in offset programs, and the extent of
mismeasurement due to information asymmetries.
In our model, we specifically focus on the concern of additionality, which
relates to the extensive literature on regulation in markets with asymmetric in-
formation. In this field, Montero (1999, 2000, 2005 and 2008) is notable among
recent work. For example, Montero (1999 and 2000) deals with opt-in programs
and the trade-off between efficiency gains of lower cost abatement and excess
emissions from adverse selection. He finds that the abatement costs of opt-in
facilities are lower to those under the cap, and that the welfare loss from excess
emissions is more than made up for in savings on abatement costs. Another
novelty of Montero (2008) is the creative use of tools from other disciplines,
such as operations research. The application of these tools effectively shift the
complications of the the usual models from the price function of offsets or per-
mits to what he calls a payback function (transfers made after the fact to the
agents), which lends itself to easier analysis.
Mason and Plantinga (2011), Guiteras, Jack and Oliva (2011) and van Ben-
them and Kerr (2011) are several recent papers that examine the issue of ad-
verse selection.2 Mason and Plantinga, as well as Guiteras, Jack and Oliva, uses
1In the rest of the paper, we refer to land owners as firms.
2Jack (2011) also conducts a field experiment in Malawi to examine the one-shot allocation
problem in environmental markets, and confirms the presence of information asymmetries in
these markets and demonstrates that project design affects both the cost effectiveness and the
environmental effectiveness of carbon offset projects.
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a textbook model of adverse selection primarily to motivate their econometric
model: Mason and Plantinga propose a land-use change model, while Guiteras,
Jack and Oliva use a modified Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism. How-
ever, their theoretical framework does not analyze the core issue that we would
like to address: how does welfare change under different levels of information
when the regulator uses different policies at her disposal. Van Benthem and
Kerr find that increasing the scale of voluntary opt-in programs to reduce emis-
sions in unregulated sectors improves efficiency and reduces transfers to agents.
Their approach, however, does not deal with the adverse selection problem di-
rectly: they study the trade-off between adverse selection and infra-marginal
transfers under different policies without solving for an optimal contract. Over-
all, none of these papers address our main question: how sensitive welfare loss
actually is when the regulator, as opposed to having sophisticated contracts at
her disposal, is limited to simple contracts such as a price instrument.
More broadly, this paper relates to the literature on optimal monitoring. For
example, Schmutzler and Goulder (1997) consider the trade-off between taxing
inputs versus taxing emissions when monitoring is imperfect. While taxation
could achieve superior welfare outcomes, our model presumes a political con-
straint that offset contracts must be voluntary. Millock, Sunding, and Zilberman
(2002), like us, allow the amount of monitoring to be a choice variable, but still
consider only tax instruments. Stranlund and Dhanda (1999) is perhaps closest
in the monitoring literature, considering the optimal amount of monitoring and
punishment in a tradable emissions permit system, but their model still exists in
an environment of mandatory emissions reductions. Regimes were emissions
reductions are driven by offsets, however, differ fundamentally from regimes
where emissions reductions are mandatory in that participation is voluntary,
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and thus offset contracts must satisfy individual rationality constraints. Our
paper focuses on this type of system.
Unlike mandatory regimes where firms are required to meet some level of
emissions or face punishment, in voluntary offset regimes, firms are offered a
take it or leave it offer of a particular price for the emission reductions they
promise to produce. While the price is typically keyed to the prevailing emis-
sions price in the market, regulators effectively vary the price offered to the
firm through regulations that discount the amount of credit a firm receives as
a function of the quality. For example, firms that sell offsets based on landfill
methane effectively get a higher price per ton than firms that sell offsets based
on afforestation. This paper thus provides guidance to regulators on how offsets
should be discounted and priced.
Finally, let us describe how this paper will develop: we set up the regula-
tor and the agents’ maximization problem and study the optimal behavior of
the agents. We then study the scenario in which the regulator can only use a
voluntary price instrument to regulate the carbon offset market. We also study
the welfare loss in this scenario under different levels of information. Here, we
find that under full information, the regulator is able to achieve the first-best
solution of no welfare loss. Under asymmetric information we find that the reg-
ulator is unable to achieve the first-best solution, but we find that an imperfect
system is still preferable to not implementing the price mechanism. That is, the
benefits of the emissions reductions always outweigh the costs imposed by ad-
ditionality. Our results are consistent in that if full monitoring is applied under
asymmetric information, the regulator is able to generate the entire surplus (it
is not optimal due to monitoring costs), and no monitoring is equivalent to ap-
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plying the instrument with no information. Finally, we note some preliminary
findings of future steps, as well as some possible modeling extensions, such as
a simple contract theory model of adverse selection included in Appendix A.
1.2 General Model
1.2.1 Firms
There exists a continuum of profit maximizing firms, which are differentiated
by their marginal cost of producing agricultural goods and their baseline emis-
sions. These are modeled as a two-dimensional random variable. θi repre-
sents the quality of land to produce agricultural goods, while βi represents
baseline emissions that are a byproduct of allocating all available land to agri-
culture. Hence, different land endowments have differing potentials to either
reduce carbon emissions and/or sequester carbon, which we will consider in-
terchangeable and refer to as producing offsets.3 pθi, βiq is defined as follows:
θi P r¯θ, θ¯s, βi P r
¯
β, β¯s, θi and βi are firm-independent and identically distributed
over firms according to some joint cumulative distribution Gpθi, βiq. For now
we assume that the marginal densities gθi and gβi exist, while later on we shall
make stronger assumptions over the distribution of θi and βi. Firms are en-
dowed with R¯ amount of land, which can be devoted to either agriculture or
offsets (denoted by R). Production is defined through the production functions
ApR¯R, θiq and F pR, βiq, which we assume to be increasing and concave in the
first argument (amount of land allocated to production) and increasing in their
3See Figure 1.3 for a better understanding of the common carbon offset projects firms or land
owners could possibly engage in.
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Figure 1.3: Common Carbon Offset Types
respective quality parameter.
1.2.2 Regulator
The regulator wishes to maximize some social welfare function, which we as-
sume is the net sum of total profits from agriculture, the social benefit derived
from offsets and the cost of “researching” firms (estimating pθi, βiq). By adding
the assumption that the price of the agricultural good is at a fixed equilibrium
(which would be valid if, say,the agricultural good is perfectly substitutable
with other consumption goods), we believe that this social welfare function ac-
curately captures the welfare components that are subject to change with respect
to the implemented policy of incentivizing offset production.
Furthermore, the regulator cannot observe pθi, βiq, so she estimates them:
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pθ˜i, β˜iq, where θ˜i  θi   ipεi,mq and β˜i  βi   jpδi,mq, where εi P r
¯
ε, ε¯s and
δi P r
¯
δ, δ¯s are random variables with a cumulative joint distribution Hpεi, δiq.
An implicit assumption is that both θ˜i and β˜i are elements in the support set of
θi and βi. We will make this assumption explicit in the following section, where
we study the case of linear production functions and uniformly distributed land
quality parameters. The quality of these estimations, as seen in the error terms
above, are determined by the regulator’s monitoring level, m P R . The cost of
monitoring is defined by Cpmq, which we assume to be increasing and convex.
The regulator’s problem is to choose the level of monitoring and the price which
she will offer for offsets.
For the rest of the paper, without loss of generality, we forgo the i sub-index
and observe the behavior of an arbitrary firm and what type of contract it will
be offered.
1.2.3 Firm Behavior
Firms maximize profits given their characteristics and the contract they are of-
fered. This contract is a given amount of offsets at a fixed price pf pβ˜q ¡ 0 (which
will depend on what type of firm the regulator believes it to be). Given a fixed
price of the agricultural good, pa ¡ 0, the firm’s maximization problem will be:
max
RˆPR 
!
paApR¯ R, θq   pf pβ˜qF pR, β˜q
)
(1.1)
Note that this objective function implies two important points: First, the only
choice variable is land; specifically, how to allocate it between projects. Second,
the profit the firm generates through producing offsets is actually a function of
9
the type of land the regulator perceives it to be, rather than its actual type.
The firm’s optimal behavior will be defined by the following first order con-
dition:
pa
BApR¯  Rˆ, θq
BR  pf pβ˜q
BF pRˆ, β˜q
BR (1.2)
where Rˆ denotes the optimal allocation of land from the firm’s perspective. An
implicit assumption of this condition is that these two curves intersect at some
value of R between 0 and R¯. However, we can easily envision firms with such
a high productivity of land, that pa
B
BR
 
ApR¯ R, θq ¡ pf pβ˜q BBR

F pR, β˜q
	
, @R,
and specifically, pa
B
BR
 
ApR¯, θq  pf pβ˜q BBR

F p0, β˜q
	
. In other words, these
firms will never produce offsets. For them, this first order condition does not
apply, and they simply devote their land to produce agricultural goods. Let us
define the fraction of firms that exhibit this characteristic by αg ¡ 0.
Though we will expand more on the regulator’s behavior, we should note
that for a given estimate pθ˜, β˜q, the regulator believes that there is an optimal al-
location of land R˜ that the firm should use for offset production, R˜  Rpθ˜, β˜, pf q,
which solves the following optimization problem:
max
R˜PR
"
paA

R¯  R˜, θ˜
	
  pf

β˜
	
F

R˜, β˜
	*
(1.3)
which is solved by the amount of land R  R˜ that satisfies the following first
order condition:
pa
BApR¯  R˜, θ˜q
BR  pf pβ˜q
BF pR˜, β˜q
BR (1.4)
This amount of land R˜ could be demonstrably greater than, less than, or
ambiguous with respect to Rˆ  Rpθ, β, β˜, pf q, depending on the relationship
10
Figure 1.4: Real and Estimated Marginal Benefit Curves of Agriculture and Off-
set Production
between the estimates pθ˜, β˜q and the actual values of pθ, βq. We will also make
reference to what we will call the “full information scenario” (where θ  θ˜ and
β  β˜), which implies an R  Rpθ, β, pf q.
Let us study one particular case depicted in Figure 1.4. The firm with the
depicted marginal benefit curves is a firm for which the regulator has overesti-
mated β and underestimated θ. This implies that the regulator believes the firm
to have a higher offset marginal productivity of land than it actually has:
θ ¡ θ˜ ùñ paa  paBApR¯ R, θqBR ¡ pa
BApR¯ R, θ˜q
BR  paa˜, @R ¥ 0
and a lower agriculture marginal productivity of land:
β˜ ¡ β ùñ pf f˜  pf BF pR, β˜qBR ¡ pf
BF pR, βq
BR  pff , @R ¥ 0
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In this case, the firm will always allocate more land to offset production than is
efficient under perfect information, but less than what the regulator expects the
firm to allocate. Mathematically, it chooses Rˆ such that R   Rˆ   R˜.
Of note in this scenario is that firms will always produce more agriculture
and less carbon offsets than what the regulator expects:
» R¯
Rˆ
pa
BApR¯ R, θq
BR dR ¡
» R¯
R˜
pa
BApR¯ R, θ˜q
BR dR
ðñ
» R¯
Rˆ
BApR¯ R, θq
BR dR ¡
» R¯
R˜
BApR¯ R, θ˜q
BR dR
and, since R˜ ¡ Rˆ and θ˜ ¡ θ, we have
ùñ ApR¯  Rˆ, θq ¡ ApR¯  R˜, θ˜q
Analogously, F pRˆ, βq   F pR˜, β˜q.
However, they are still producing more offsets and less agriculture than
what would be expected in the full information case:
» R¯
R
pa
BApR¯ R, θq
BR dR ¡
» R¯
Rˆ
pa
BApR¯ R, θq
BR dR
ðñ
» R¯
R
BApR¯ R, θq
BR dR ¡
» R¯
Rˆ
BApR¯ R, θq
BR dR
and, since Rˆ ¡ R
ùñ ApR¯ R, θq ¡ ApR¯  Rˆ, θq
By the same logic, F pR, βq   F pRˆ, βq.
For the case in which the regulator overestimates θ and underestimates β,
we get the reverse case:
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$'''''&
'''''%
R ¡ Rˆ ¡ R˜
ApR¯ R, θq   ApR¯  Rˆ, θq   ApR¯  R˜, θ˜q
F pR, βq ¡ F pRˆ, βq ¡ F pR˜, β˜q
Intuitively, this means that offset production is more land intensive than
what the regulator anticipates, yet not as land intensive as they would be in
the full information case.
1.2.4 Regulator’s Behavior
The regulator will observe noisy signals of pθ, βq, pθ˜, β˜q. Then, she will solve
the welfare problem and offer a price pf pβ˜q for each ton of carbon emissions the
regulator believes would be reduced given the regulator’s best guess for β. In
a first-best world with perfect information, the price offered would equal the
social benefit of reducing each ton of emissions, pe ¡ 0. However, given the
uncertainties over land quality, the regulator will optimally distort the price to
account for the “quality” of the emissions reduction (which, in fact, is the actual
quantity of emissions reductions as opposed to the regulator’s noisy expecta-
tion).
When solving her optimization problem, the regulator takes into account the
ex post realization of how much land was actually allocated, Rˆ  Rpθ, β, β˜, pf q.
This decision is then an input into the regulator’s social welfare maximization
problem, where she must solve for the optimal level of monitoring and the price
that she will offer for offsets production. Now, we can proceed to setup and
analyze the regulator’s problem:
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max
m,pf
V

θ, β, θ˜, β˜, pf
	
(1.5)
where V pθ, β, θ˜, β˜, pf q 
¼
θ,β

¼
ε,δ

paA

R¯  Rˆ, θ
	
  peF

Rˆ, β
	
 Cpmq

dH pε, δq
ﬁ
ﬃﬂ dGpθ, βq (1.6)
V pθ, β, θ˜, β˜, pf q is the total welfare expression given the optimal decision
of the firm, Rˆ. Note that this implies that the regulator has full information
about technology: she knows what the production functions look like. The only
sources of uncertainty are the specific characteristics of the firm, θ and β.
Given this setup, we can proceed to solve for the regulator’s optimal carbon
offset price and level of monitoring. The optimality conditions for the regulator
(applying Leibniz’s rule) are:
m :
¼
θ,β


¼
ε,δ



pa
BApR¯Rˆ,θq
BR
  pe BFpRˆ,βqBR

dRˆ
dm
 C 1 pmq
ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬂ dH pε, δq
ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬃﬂ dG pθ, βq  0 (1.7)
where
dRˆ
dm
 BRˆBβ˜
Bj pδ,mq
Bm
and
pf :
¼
θ,β


¼
ε,δ



pa
BApR¯Rˆ,θq
BR
  pe BFpRˆ,βqBR

 BRˆBpf
ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬂ dH pε, δq
ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬃﬂ dG pθ, βq  0 (1.8)
Substituting (1.2) into (1.8), we get:
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pf :
¼
θ,β


¼
ε,δ



pf

β˜
	 BFpRˆ,β˜q
BR
  pe BFpRˆ,βqBR

 BRˆBpf
ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬂ dH pε, δq
ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬃﬂ dG pθ, βq  0 (1.9)
Recall that pe is the marginal social benefit of each unit of carbon offsets.
Note that the price that the regulator will offer is fully dependent on the offset
production function, only depending on the agricultural production function in
so far as that affects the land allocation decision of the firm. Here we can again
see that if β˜  β, or in other words, δ  0, we could set pe  pf and transform the
firm’s problem to the regulator’s. However, since δ  0 in general, some loss in
welfare should be expected to occur. The welfare loss associated to asymmetric
information (with respect to the perfect information scenario) should then be
∆  Vˆ  V  
¼
θ,β


¼
ε,δ


pa

A

R¯  Rˆ, θ
	
 A  R¯ R, θ
  pe

F

Rˆ, β
	
 F pR, βq

ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬃﬂ dH pε, δq
ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬂ dG pθ, βq (1.10)
The loss of welfare is, of course, due to the suboptimal allocation of land.
This allocation of land contributes to welfare reduction by distorting the level of
both agricultural and offsets production. Specifically, welfare is a function of the
decrease (or increase) of agricultural output caused by the inefficient allocation
of land, and the difference between the actual realization of offsets production
and the offsets that would have been produced with the optimal allocation of
land.
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1.3 Linear Case
In order to allow us to obtain closed form solutions, let us study a particular
production function. Namely, let us assume that production is linear in both
agriculture and offsets. Specifically,
A
 
R¯ R, θ  θ  R¯ R and F pR, βq  βR
Given this assumption, the firms’ maximization problem is now:
max
RˆPR
"
paθ
 
R¯ R  pf β˜	 β˜R
*
(1.11)
The linearity of the production functions implies a corner solution where
the firm will only allocate land to agriculture or offsets, but not both. The firm’s
optimal land allocation is given by:
Rˆ 
$'''''&
'''''%
R¯, if pf

β˜
	
β˜ ¡ paθ
R P 0, R¯ , if pf β˜	 β˜  paθ
0, if pf

β˜
	
β˜   paθ
(1.12)
Note that the conditions for each value of Rˆ also define the fractions of firms
that will produce either just agriculture or just offsets. Similarly, the allocations
of land according to the regulator allowing for asymmetric information R˜ and
with perfect information R are presented below:
R˜ 
$'''''&
'''''%
R¯, if pf

β˜
	
β˜ ¡ paθ˜
R P 0, R¯ , if pf β˜	 β˜  paθ˜
0, if pf

β˜
	
β˜   paθ˜
(1.13)
16
and
R 
$''''&
''''%
R¯, if pf pβq β ¡ paθ
R P 0, R¯ , if pf pβq β  paθ
0, if pf pβq β   paθ
(1.14)
Now, let us define the measurement error the regulator experiences when
trying to estimate pθ˜, β˜q. One of the implications of pf only being a function of
β˜ is that it is not necessary to specify a functional form for θ˜. This is due to how
profits are generated: agricultural profit is only function of the firm’s real ability
to produce agricultural goods. Let us define β˜ by imposing some structure on
the information production function jpq:
β˜  β   j pδ,mq  β   δ, where δ  U

¯
β  β
m  1 ,
β¯  β
m  1
ﬀ
(1.15)
The motivation behind the functional form of the upper and lower bound
of the uniform distribution over δ is that we want to, in some sense, properly
model monitoring. If the regulator does not perform any monitoring pm  0q,
we want her to have no good estimate for β: it can be any value between
¯
β
and β¯. On the other hand, as the regulator increases her level of monitor-
ing, the bounds converge towards the real value, β. In other words, as mon-
itoring goes to infinity, the measurement error goes to zero. Mathematically,
limmÑ8 δ
 
Fβ pβq ,m
  0. Also, if we assume Bpf pβqBβ ¡ 0, we can show that:4
Rˆ  R ðñ pf

β˜
	
β˜  paθ  pf pβq β
ðñ β˜  β ðñ δ  0 or m  8
4This condition is proven when solving the regulator’s problem
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In other words, the regulator can only know the true value of β in a world of
asymmetric information by implementing infinite monitoring. This implies that
we will always have a welfare loss if there exists some uncertainty over β.
The linearity of the production functions also allows us to partition the space
of firms into three different types:
I. All firms that satisfy pf

β˜
	
β˜ ¡ paθ will only produce offsets.
II. All firms that satisfy pf

β˜
	
β˜   paθ will only produce agriculture.
III. All firms that satisfy pf

β˜
	
β˜  paθ are indifferent between producing ei-
ther good.
We will study the firms in categories (I) and (III), with the understanding
that all remaining firms in the continuum will belong to category (II).
1.3.1 Regulator’s Problem
As before, the regulator first estimates the firm’s decision and uses that expected
outcome to calculate the welfare maximizing monitoring and offset prices. In
the linear production technologies case, this welfare problem is as follows:
max
pf ,m
V

θ, β, θ˜, β˜, pf
	
(1.16)
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where
V pθ, β, θ˜, β˜, pf q 
¼
θ,β

¼
ε,δ

paθ

R¯  Rˆ
	
  peβRˆ  C pmq

dH pε, δq
ﬁ
ﬃﬂ dG pθ, βq
 R¯

½
θ,β,δ
paθdH pδq dG pθ, βq   peβdH pδq dG pθ, βq
ﬁ
ﬃﬂ C pmq
Assuming a uniform distribution over all variables, and assuming that
¯
β ¡
pa
pf¯
θ and β¯   pa
pf
θ¯, then we have:5
 R¯



» β¯
¯
β
» β¯β
m 1
¯
ββ
m 1

» θ¯
pf
pa
pβ δq
paθdθ  
» pf
pa
pβ δq
¯
θ
peβdθ
ﬁ
ﬂ m  1
∆θp∆βq2dδdβ


ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬂ C pmq
Solving for this integral and simplifying we get:
 R¯
∆θ



paθ¯2
2
 p
2
f
pa pm  1q

m2   1
2 pm  1qE
 
β2
  m
m  1Epβq
2
ﬁﬂ 

pepf
pa pm  1q

Epβq2  mE  β2 pe
¯
θE pβq
ﬀ
 C pmq
From this expression we can derive the new first order conditions:
pf :
R¯
∆θ

 2pf
pa pm  1q

m2   1
2 pm  1qE
 
β2
  m
m  1Epβq
2

  pe
pa pm  1q

Epβq2  mE  β2  0 (1.17)
m :
R¯
∆θ
p2e
pa
Var pβq

pe   pf  m
 
pe  pf
  C 1pmq (1.18)
5Respectively, these assumptions are made to ensure that there exists a positive number of
firms for which offset production (or inaction) and agricultural production is always optimal.
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From (1.17) we can solve for the optimal offset price, pf :
pf  pe

Epβq2pm  1 q2   Var pβq  m2  m
Epβq2pm  1 q2   Var pβq pm2   1q
 (1.19)
Substituting (1.19) into (1.18) gives us:
ùñ R¯
∆θ
p3e
pa
Var pβq

E
 
β2
  Epβq2 Epβq2  mE  β2
E pβ2q pm2   1q   2Epβq2m
2  C 1 pmq (1.20)
Note that the optimal offset price that is offered by the regulator depends
solely on the expected value of β, the uncertainty of β (as captured by its vari-
ance), and the amount of monitoring that the regulator will choose. Hence, pf
is set equal to the marginal social benefit of each unit of carbon offsets adjusted
to reflect the regulator’s uncertainty over the quality of the land in the pro-
duction of offsets. Given this solution for pf , we can graph the firms that pro-
duce either agricultural goods or carbon offsets on the pθ, β, δq plane. The defin-
ing property for firms which are indifferent between producing either good is
pf pβ   δq  paθ. We can gain some intuition by graphically depicting this equi-
librium condition. Figure 1.5 shows the parallelepiped which defines the con-
tinuum of firms, as well as the plane that divides it into firms that produce agri-
culture goods or and those that produce carbon offsets. Specifically, the firms
below the plane produce agriculture goods while the firms above it produce
carbon offsets.
Futhermore, Figure 1.6 shows the cross-section of the pθ, β, δq body of firms
when β˜  β. For illustrative purposes, we assume m  1. Firms in the area
labeled αo are those that will always choose to produce carbon offsets. For them,
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Figure 1.5: 3D Continuum and Division of Firms over pθ, β, δq
pf β˜ ¡ paθ for all price levels since θ is negative. Without a carbon offset policy,
these firms would still have produced offsets since not producing agriculture
goods is their optimal choice. Firms in α2 will also choose to produce carbon
offsets, given the pf being offered. For these firms, a lower offset price would
have sufficed to induce them to produce carbon offsets. Firms in α2 and αg will
choose to continue to produce agriculture goods since the price of offsets being
offered by the regulator results in lower returns from offset production than
from agriculture. For firms in αg, this will always be the case – for these firms,
pf pβ˜qβ˜   paθ holds.
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Figure 1.6: 2D Continuum and Division of Firms over pθ, βq
1.3.2 Comparative Statics and Optimal Variable Interactions
The intuition behind the expression for pf , the optimal carbon offset price, is
clear when m Ñ 8: as monitoring increases and we approach full information,
the optimal carbon offset price approaches the marginal benefit of environmen-
tal protection ppf Ñ peq. At lower levels of monitoring, asymmetric information
leads to inefficient pricing schemes. As increases in monitoring lead to better
information on the quality of the land, the regulator will pay the farmer exactly
the marginal environmental benefit gained from that offset.
Another result that can be derived from the optimality conditions is that the
need for monitoring decreases as the difference between β¯ and
¯
β, the variation
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in quality of land with respect to production of carbon offsets, becomes smaller.
We can prove that m goes to zero in the limit: if β¯ 
¯
β  B, we have

R¯
∆θ
p2e
pa
2
pm  1q3
ﬀ
 0  0  C 1 pmq
By the assumption that C pmq is increasing and convex, we know that
C 1 pmq  0 ðñ m  0. The price of offsets at the limit then becomes
pf  pe

Epβq2{E  β2  pe. As expected, this is the same outcome seen with
perfect monitoring, since in both cases, the regulator has perfect information
and is able to price the offsets exactly at their environmental value.
On the other hand, as the variation over agricultural soil quality shrinks,
the relative value of monitoring increases. To see this, note that as ∆θ Ñ 0,
C 1 pmq Ñ 8 ðñ m  8. Intuitively, as firms become more similar in
terms of agricultural quality, the pf each is willing to accept also becomes more
similar. Thus, the regulator will need to choose an offset price more carefully
so as to insure that the proportion of firms that accept it will not be excessively
high or low. Because of this, monitoring becomes increasingly valuable.
Finally, since m ¥ 0, we know that

Epβq2pm 1 q2 Varpβqpm2 mq
Epβq2pm 1 q2 Varpβqpm2 1q   1 if and only
if m   1. This implies that the optimal pf will be below pe if m   1 and above
pe if m ¡ 1. More importantly, the price pf is increasing over the range m P
r0, 1 ?2
?
pEpβ2q Epβq2q
Epβ2q s, and decreasing over m ¡
?
2
?
pEpβ2q Epβq2q
Epβ2q . Intuitively,
for low levels of monitoring, the regulator must increase the incentive to firms in
order to generate higher participation in the program. As monitoring increases,
however, the offset price converges downwards to the social benefit pe due to
the increased quality of information.
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1.3.3 Welfare at the Extremes
We now explore the results of this model as the level of information and the
price mechanism vary between extremes
No Price Mechanism
With no price mechanism, which necessarily means no information, the result-
ing welfare is
V0  R¯
∆θ

paθ¯
2
2
 pe
¯
θE pβq
ﬀ
(1.21)
No Information with Price Mechanism
With no information, but assuming the linear contract studied above, we have
a welfare level of
VNI  R¯
∆θ

paθ¯
2
2
  p
2
e
2pa
Epβq4
Var pβq   Epβq2  pe¯θE pβq
ﬀ
(1.22)
Notice that implementing a price mechanism always results in an increase
in welfare:
∆V  VNI  V0  R¯
∆θ
p2e
2pa

Epβq4
Var pβq   Epβq2
ﬀ
¡ 0
Even though the regulator does not monitor and therefore has no reliable
information on the specific values of β, implementing the price mechanism is
welfare increasing. This result is driven by the assumption that the regulator
knows the distribution of β. However, this is a realistic assumption given that,
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though a regulator may not know the exact quality of a given piece of land,
she has access to plenty of data to potentially form an informed prior over land
quality.
Perfect Information
With perfect information (without the need to monitor), we have
VPI  R¯
∆θ

paθ¯
2
2
  p
2
e
2pa

Var pβq   Epβq2

 pe
¯
θE pβq
ﬀ
(1.23)
Hence, the maximum welfare loss attributable to not implementing the price
mechanism is
∆V  VPI  V0  R¯
∆θ
p2e
2pa

Var pβq   Epβq2

¡ 0
Asymmetric Information
We have already computed the level of welfare associated with having asym-
metric information – we did this when solving for the regulator’s optimization
problem – but it is useful to note the welfare gain by implementing the price
mechanism:
∆V  VM  V0  R¯
∆θ
p2e
pa



Epβq2  mE  β22
2

pm2   1qE pβ2q   2mEpβq2

ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬂ C pmq
 R¯
∆θ
pe
2pa
pf
m  1  C pmq
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This allows us make our final observation on the optimal choices of m and
pf : C pmq must be such that ∆V pmq ¡ 0, or, C pmq   R¯
∆θ
pe
2pa
pf
m   1 . In other
words, if the cost of monitoring is too high, the regulator will rationally choose
not to monitor.
1.3.4 Additionality
Firms which produce offsets are characterized by the condition paθ   pf β˜. How-
ever, firms that satisfy the property θ   0 would have produced offsets anyway.
Since the regulator cannot exclude any firm from participating (her only avail-
able instrument is to offer an implicit price for offsets where the per unit off-
set price is the same offered to all firms but the estimation of offsets quantity
production is firm specific), we have a number of non-additional offsets. Intu-
itively, since the agricultural production drops out of the regulator’s decision, as
seen above, the firm’s opportunity cost of entering into an offsets contract with
the regulator is not accounted for. Hence, firms whose agricultural production
functions are such that they would not produce agricultural goods will always
enter into a profitable contract with the regulator and get paid for doing what
they would have done absent the carbon offsets program.
To see how this additionality problem is affected by information, let us again
examine each scenario of information:
No Price Mechanism
F0  R¯
» β¯
¯
β
» 0
¯
θ
β
∆β∆θ
dθdβ  R¯ ¯θ
∆θ
E pβq (1.24)
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F0 is the number of offsets produced with no price mechanism. Note that this
number is positive, since
¯
θ   0 by assumption (there is a positive number of
firms that have no incentive to farm their land). These are the non-additional
offsets.
No Information with Price Mechanism
FNI 
» β¯
¯
β
» β¯β
¯
ββ
» pf
pa
pβ δq
¯
θ
β
p∆βq2∆θdθdδdβ
  ¯θ
∆θ
E pβq   pf
pa
Epβq2
∆θ
 R¯ ¯θ
∆θ
E pβqloooooomoooooon
Non Additional Offsets
  pe
pa
R¯
∆θ

Epβq4
Varpβq   E pβq2
ﬀ
looooooooooooooomooooooooooooooon
Additional Offsets
(1.25)
where we have plugged in for pf pm  0q. Here we can see that by implement-
ing the program, even with no additional information on land quality, we can
increase the number of offsets produced. Since the second term, the additional
offsets, is strictly positive for positive prices and nonnegative average emissions
reduction capability, any price mechanism results in a number of firms reallo-
cating some land from agricultural production to offsets production.
Perfect Information
FPI  R¯
» β¯
¯
β
» pe
pa
pβ δq
¯
θ
β
∆β∆θ
dθdβ  R¯ ¯θ
∆θ
E pβqloooooomoooooon
Non Additional Offsets
  pe
pa
R¯
∆θ

Varpβq   E pβq2

looooooooooooooomooooooooooooooon
Additional Offsets
(1.26)
Looking at the other information extreme, where the regulator has perfect
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information, shows an increase in the number of offsets produced.6 Thus, the
no information case always results in an inefficiently low production level of
offsets.
Asymmetric Information
FM  R¯
» β¯
¯
β
» β¯β
m 1
¯
ββ
m 1
» pf
pa
pβ δq
¯
θ
β
pm  1q
p∆βq2∆θdθdδdβ
 R¯ ¯θ
∆θ
E pβq   pf
pa
R¯
∆θ

Epβq2  mE  β2
m  1loooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooon
 R¯ ¯θ
∆θ
E pβqloooooomoooooon
Non Additional Offsets
  pe
pa
R¯
∆θ

Epβq2  mE  β22
pm2   1qE pβ2q   2mEpβq2looooooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooooon
Additional Offsets
(1.27)
Under asymmetric information and the inclusion of a price mechanism, the
number of additional offsets is a function of how much monitoring the regula-
tor chooses. When m  0, we confirm our result for no information. Also, when
m Ñ 8, the number of additional offsets converges to pe
pa
1
∆θ
E
 
β2

, which we
will see in our next result, matches up with the number of offsets when the
regulator has full information. One last note: the number of additional offsets
is increasing in m, which also confirms our intuition that as we increase mon-
itoring, the number of offsets increases. This occurs because adverse selection
is reduced (firms with low values of β drop out and firms with higher values
of β opt in), but, as we shall see in the next segment, this occurs through two
mechanisms.
6This result follows from Epβ2q  Varpβq   Epβq2.
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Table 1.1: Types of Firms and Causes of Inefficiency
Firms Action
peβ   paθ   pf β˜ Produce offsets when agriculture would be optimal
pf β˜   paθ   peβ Produce agriculture when offsets would be optimal
paθ   pf β˜   peβ Produce offsets, but compensation is less than optimal
paθ   peβ   pf β˜ Produce offsets, but compensation is more than optimal
1.3.5 Division of Firms
E Let us now study which and how many firms opt in under each scenario
of information quality. We derive closed form expressions for these quantities.
The number of firms in each scenario will differ depending on the amount of
information the regulator has (in other words, it will depend on m). It is also
important to note that under each of these scenarios we have several forms of
inefficiency that can occur (see Table 1.1).
No Price Mechanism
Recall that we have assumed that firms are distributed uniformly over the rel-
evant ranges of the pθ, βq space. Hence, we can normalize the number of firms
with respect to the total area of firms (which is equal to ∆β∆θ). This can per-
haps be seen more easily by noting that since we assumed a continuum of firms
distributed evenly over a specific area, the integral of the joint cumulative dis-
tribution function is equal to 1. After this, we simply multiply by the relevant
area. Our normalized number of firms is now:
αo  ∆β∆θ
» β¯
¯
β
» 0
¯
θ
1
∆β∆θ
dθdβ 
» β¯
¯
β
» 0
¯
θ
1dθdβ  
¯
θ∆β (1.28)
This is precisely the number we get by observing that the number of firms
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that would never produce agriculture even if the policy were not implemented
is the rectangle with sides ∆β and p0
¯
θq 
¯
θ.
No Information with Price Mechanism
αNI  ∆β∆θ
» β¯
¯
β
» β¯β
¯
ββ
» pf
pa
pβ δq
¯
θ
1
p∆βq2∆θdθdδdβ
 ∆β


¯
θ   pf
pa
E pβq

 
¯
θ∆βlomon
αo
  pe
pa
∆β
Epβq3
Varpβq   Epβq2looooooooooooomooooooooooooon
α1
(1.29)
The area of firms α1 can be interpreted as a trapezoid with parallel sides of
length
pf
pa¯
β and
pf
pa
β¯, and height ∆β. Then, after plugging in for pf when m  0,
we get our final expression for α1.
Perfect Information
αPI  ∆β∆θ
» β¯
¯
β
» pe
pa
β
¯
θ
1
∆β∆θ
dθdβ  
¯
θ∆β   pe
pa
∆βEpβq (1.30)
Under perfect information and with a price mechanism, the share of firms
that will enter into carbon offsets contracts will always be larger than in the no
information case.7 Now we can note the intuitiveness of α1: as Varpβq Ñ 0,
αNI Ñ αPI . This meshes well with our previous result that monitoring being
less and less important as the uncertainty over β is reduced.
7This is implied by Varpβq  Epβ2q  Epβq ¡ 0.
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Asymmetric Information
αM  ∆β∆θ
» β¯
¯
β
» β¯β
m 1
¯
ββ
m 1
» pf
pa
pβ δq
¯
θ
pm  1q
p∆βq2∆θdθdδdβ
 ∆β


¯
θ   pf
pa
E pβq

 
¯
θ∆βlomon
αo
  pe
pa
∆β
pm  1q

Epβq2  mE  β2E pβq
2mEpβq2   pm2   1qE pβ2qloooooooooooooooooooooooooomoooooooooooooooooooooooooon
α1 α3
(1.31)
The same geometric interpretation made above can be made here: the ad-
ditional number of firms is just the trapezoid α1   α3 seen in Figure 1.6. Note,
however, that changes inm lead to changes in pf . This results in more firms opt-
ing in than in the no information scenario. As m increases, pf will also increase.
A higher pf will make it more desirable for some firms to enter. However, as
m increases the range over which β is estimated is reduced. This implies that
the total payment to the firm to produce carbon offsets, which is a function of
both the offsets price and the regulator’s estimation of the quantity of offsets
produced by the land, can either increase or decrease.
It turns out that for m P

0, 1 ?2
b
Epβ2q Epβq2
Epβ2q
ﬀ
, the number of firms that
opt in increases: the net effect of increasing the price is that more firms, even
firms which are not necessarily good at producing offsets, will opt in. However,
for m ¡ m¯  1   ?2
b
Epβ2q Epβq2
Epβ2q , we observe that the number of firms in the
program decreases gradually: there is a weeding out process of bad firms, and
even though there is a net loss in firms, the fact that the remaining firms are the
better ones at producing offsets will imply a greater number of total offsets. Also
note that at m  1, we have the same number of firms as when m  8, though
the change in the composition of firms due to monitoring produces differing
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levels of total offset production.
To summarize this result, we find adverse selection for all values of m, but,
as m increases, this adverse selection converges to zero. To expand on this, for
the range m P r0, m¯s there is a net increase in firms that opt in. We can describe
this range as “casting a wider net”, and, as we move along m P rm¯,8q, firms
that should not have opted in but chose to for small levels of m, now in fact
decide against producing offsets.
1.3.6 Summary of Propositions
Proposition 1.1 Under perfect information, the regulator is able to implement the
first-best option of pricing offsets at the price pe, the marginal social benefit from a
unit of carbon offset. This follows from the regulator’s ability to perfectly discriminate.
She will not purchase any offsets from firms which fall into the region pe
¯
β   paθ nor
any firm will sell offsets if they are in the region peβ¯   paθ.
Welfare under this regime is
VPI  R¯
∆θ

paθ¯
2
2
  p
2
e
2pa

Var pβq   Epβq2

 pe
¯
θE pβq
ﬀ
The number of firms which will opt in will be
αPI  ∆β∆θ
» β¯
¯
β
» pe
pa
β
¯
θ
1
∆β∆θ
dθdβ  
¯
θ∆β   pe
pa
∆βEpβq
And the number of offset produced is
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FPI  R¯ ¯θ
∆θ
E pβqloooooomoooooon
Non Additional Offsets
  pe
pa
R¯
∆θ

Var pβq   Epβq2

looooooooooooooomooooooooooooooon
Additional Offsets
Proposition 1.2 Under no information, the regulator is only able to implement the
worst case scenario of the price instrument. In other words, it is equivalent to imple-
menting the price instrument but without any monitoring. The regulator will offer the
price pf  pe

Epβq2
Var pβq   Epβq2
ﬀ
  pe.
This implies that there are firms that would have produced offsets under per-
fect information, but will not under no information. This is the main source of
adverse selection. Welfare under this regime is
VNI  R¯
∆θ

paθ¯
2
2
  p
2
e
2pa
Epβq4
Var pβq   Epβq2  pe¯θE pβq
ﬀ
The number of firms which will opt in is
αNI  
¯
θ∆β   pe
pa
∆β
Epβq3
Var pβq   Epβq2
And the number of offsets produced will be
FNI 
» β¯
¯
β
» β¯β
¯
ββ
» pf
pa
pβ δq
¯
θ
β
p∆βq2∆θdθdδdβ
 R¯ ¯θ
∆θ
E pβqloooooomoooooon
Non Additional Offsets
  pe
pa
R¯
∆θ
Epβq4
Var pβq   Epβq2looooooooooooomooooooooooooon
Additional Offsets
Proposition 1.3 Under the price instrument, the regulator will implement the follow-
ing optimal discount:
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pf  pe

Epβq2pm  1 q2   Var pβq  m2  m
Epβq2pm  1 q2   Var pβq pm2   1q

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
E
 
β2
  Epβq2 Epβq2  mE  β2
E pβ2q pm2   1q   2Epβq2m
2  C 1 pmq
The optimal level of monitoring is m ¡ 0. The optimal offset price pf can be either
greater or less than pe.
This, as in the no information case, will produce a sub-optimal allocation,
though it is a welfare improvement over the no information case and, as shown
below, the case in which no price mechanisms are introduced. Welfare under
this scenario is
VM  R¯
∆θ



paθ¯
2
2
 p
2
f
papm 1q

m2 1
2pm 1qE
 
β2
  m
m 1Epβq2
	
 

pepf
papm 1q

Epβq2  mE  β2 pe
¯
θE pβq

ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬃﬂ C pmq
Observe that VM pm  8q  VPI and VM pm  0q  VNI . From our previous
comparison of welfare between no information and perfect information com-
bined with m being an interior solution, we know that VPI ¡ VM pmq ¡ VNI .
The number of firms that opt in are
αM  
¯
θ∆β   pe
pa
∆β
pm  1q

Epβq2  mE  β2E pβq
2mEpβq2   pm2   1qE pβ2q
And the number of offsets produced are
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Proposition 1.4 If no offset program is implemented, by construction pf  0 and
m  0.
Welfare under this scenario is
V0  R¯
∆θ

paθ¯
2
2
 pe
¯
θE pβq
ﬀ
We can compare V0 to VNI to determine if, with respect to the entire range of
firms, it is desirable to implement such a program:
VNI  R¯
∆θ

paθ¯
2
2
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2
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p2e
2pa
Epβq4
Var pβq   Epβq2 ¡ 0
Hence, it is always beneficial as a whole to implement the price instrument,
even if the regulator has no additional information besides her prior over dis-
tributions. The number of firms that produce offsets are
αo  ∆β∆θ
» β¯
¯
β
» 0
¯
θ
1
∆β∆θ
dθdβ  
¯
θ∆β
And the number of offsets produced are
F0  R¯
» β¯
¯
β
» 0
¯
θ
β
∆β∆θ
dθdβ  R¯ ¯θ
∆θ
E pβq
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1.4 Conclusion
We use a carbon offset market context to show that for an uninformed regu-
lator who only has a voluntary price instrument at her disposal, she can offer
a contract that compensates private agents for producing carbon offsets while
reducing adverse selection and welfare losses. Our results hold under varying
degrees of uncertainty. The first-best solution is achievable under perfect in-
formation or free monitoring. Under asymmetric information and for positive
costs of monitoring, we can identify the inefficiencies generated from the addi-
tionality problem created by problems of adverse selection. We also show that
the net social benefit of an offsets program is always positive. The model created
in this paper extends the carbon offsets literature by showing how a voluntary
system of carbon offsets, combined with costly monitoring and imperfect infor-
mation, compares to systems with no offsets pricing mechanism. Though the
problem of additionality can only be solved with complete information or mon-
itoring, the results show that the costs associated with additionality do not offset
the gains from pursuing a voluntary carbon offset pricing scheme. Importantly,
we find that, even in the absence of any information, a pricing mechanism will
always be an improvement over no pricing mechanism.
Finally, in Appendix A, we sketch out the general problem of creating an
optimal contract using a game theoretic model of adverse selection.8 Future
steps that can be undertaken in this line of research include moving to a sce-
nario in which the properties of the land are not independent of each other;
they are, realistically, correlated. Preliminary results of this extension indicate
that this more complex environment should not qualitatively affect our results,
8Mason and Plantinga (2011) approach this problem with a very similar framework.
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and, intuitively, as the level of correlation goes to 0 we converge to our previ-
ous findings (when correlation goes to 1, the model collapses to the perfect
information case). Another possible extension of this work would be to con-
struct a more sophisticated framework for the optimal contracting problem in
order to model real-world characteristics. For example: incorporating hetero-
geneous reservation utilities (or equivalently, heterogeneous costs of emissions
reduction), as shown in Jullien (2000), would allow for a more careful study of
the trade-off the firm faces when deciding land use; and, following the work of
Armstrong (1996), as well as Armstrong and Rochet (1999), incorporating mul-
tidimensional screening over different parameters of uncertainty (in our case,
agricultural and carbon offset land quality) would allow for a richer monitoring
environment.
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CHAPTER 2
CEO SELECTION: A TOURNAMENT
2.1 Introduction
The strategy employed in choosing the right personnel, particularly for upper
management, is one of the most important yet vexing issues faced by firms,
impacting corporate policies as well as the long-run evolution and success of
the firm. Unobservable heterogeneity over potential candidates affects the deci-
sion of who to hire or promote to upper management, and firms would be best
served addressing this concern. In this paper, we explore how a firm, through
a cardinal tournament, chooses its next CEO from a pool of managers that are
heterogeneous along two dimensions: ability and risk aversion. These traits of
the manager are particularly interesting to consider since the manager’s output
can rarely be attributed to just ability or risk aversion. To the extent that a firm
wishes to promote the most able manager, the firm must contend with the noisy
signals generated from both risk aversion and ability. In fact, Goel and Thakor
(2007) show that managers who are overconfident skew the odds in their favor
and are more likely to be promoted to CEO than rational ones. They also show
that this noisiness is not always detrimental: if the CEO is risk averse, this bias
in beliefs could even add value to the firm.
This paper broadly relates to the tournament theory literature, of which
Lazear and Rosen (1981) is considered its seminal paper. Tournament theory
describes scenarios in which the wage difference between agents is not based
on their marginal productivity, but on the relative difference, or rank, of the
agents. Lazear and Rosen find that if an appropriately sized reward is given to
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the winner of the tournament, the agents select the first-best effort level. They
also find that if the signal of the agents’ skill (output) is noisier, or if there is a
larger pool of candidates, in order to induce the first-best effort level the win-
ner’s reward must be increased. Lazear and Rosen’s work sparked a number
of extensions of their general ideas, most notably by Green and Stokey (1983),
Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) and Rosen (1986). Nalebuff and Stiglitz incorporate
risk aversion and allow for penalties as well as rewards. Green and Stokey show
the usefulness of tournaments at netting out the common shocks to employee
performance. Rosen extends the basic model to a multiple round elimination
tournament and shows that, in this context, prizes must be concentrated among
a small and select group of agents to keep incentives strong. Finally, Dye (1984),
Lazear (1989) and Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1991) discuss the potential pit-
falls of a tournament: non-cooperative behavior, such as sabotage or collusion,
may counteract the incentive-aligning effect of large spreads in compensation.
Although our model is not a rank-order tournament, as most in the tour-
nament theory literature, we believe it serves our objective, which is to study
the impact of ability and risk aversion on manager performance and potential
promotion. With this goal in mind, we build a model of a CEO tournament
in a representative firm. The firm chooses its next CEO from a pool of n man-
agers. The managers are known to be heterogeneous in level of ability and risk
aversion. However, the firm cannot identify these traits. Managers are assigned
to individual projects that they can affect through their ability or risk aversion,
or, equivalently, the can choose a specific project from a continuum of avail-
able projects. Project cash flows are random variables characterized by its two
first moments. Managers control the expected return and volatility (or standard
variance) of the project’s cash flow.
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Furthermore, the firm offers the manager a contract that is linear in the
project’s cash flow as compensation. We assume that this sensitivity of the com-
pensation to performance would solve any moral hazard problems, i.e., man-
agers dedicate their maximal level of effort to the firm. An equivalent inter-
pretation of our setup is that “contracts do not matter”, the managers’ wealth
variations are due to the change in the value of their holdings.1 Since most
CEOs have a large proportion of their wealth exposed to the firm performance,
understanding the impact of CEO risk aversion on corporate policies is critical.2
The firm, meanwhile, observes the mean of the project’s cash flow realiza-
tions but cannot learn the manager’s type. We envision the firm selecting the
winner through a specific decision rule. We propose several possible decision
rules to be the new CEO and proceed to study one of them in depth. Abstracting
from luck, or assuming it is randomly distributed, the realized project perfor-
mance is the result of the CEO’s ability and/or her risk strategy.
Moreover, the manager’s ability should impact the set of projects available
to them, which is defined through the firm’s technology level. In other words,
managerial ability may be able to augment – or diminish – the firm’s given tech-
nological capacity. Hence, we analyze how differing technology levels and the
manager’s traits affect the firm’s promotion choice. We examine two differ-
ent specifications: CARA preferences with normally distributed cash flows and
CRRA preferences with log-normally distributed cash flows. We identify a two-
dimensional solution set of levels of ability and risk aversion corresponding for
each possible level of return, which is illustrated in Figure 2.1. This graph rep-
resents combinations of manager’s levels of ability and risk aversion explaining
1Jensen and Murphy (1990) provide empirical evidence in favor of low powered contracts.
2For example, it is forbidden for executives to hedge their position in the firm; hence risk
averse managers tend to underinvest and so destroy some value for shareholders.
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a given expected cash flow return. We find that the relationship between abil-
ity and risk aversion is concave. Furthermore, we observe that, as the level of
technology improves, the relative importance of risk aversion with respect to
ability increases (and vice versa). This result suggests that industries or firms
with different levels of technology will be best served attempting to identify the
traits which are best suited for their specific context.
Finally, we include a note at the end of the paper that analyzes a different
decision rule, one based solely on observed cash flow. Though we use this note
mainly to illustrate a possible direction of future research, we are able derive
an expression for the probability of a given manager winning the tournament
and being promoted to CEO. This expression is a function of her characteristics,
as well as of the characteristics of the rest of the candidate pool. This indicates
that, with a more sophisticated model that allows for game theoretic behavior,
we could potentially find different optimal managerial decisions, especially if
the managers have heterogeneous preferences over being promoted.
2.2 General Model
We assume a pool of n managers, who are rational (i.e., they have correct be-
liefs) and have heterogeneous preferences and levels of ability. Preferences are
characterized by an increasing, concave utility function uppq, with a relative co-
efficient of risk aversion, R. Ability, A, is defined by the choice set of projects
available to a manager. A and R are random and uncorrelated variables.
The cash flow of the project or unit controlled by manager i follows a certain
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distribution, D, characterized by its first two moments:
Xi  Dpµi, σ2i q
The contract offered to the manager is linear in the cash flows realized in
her business unit: W˜  w¯   βX˜i, with β ¥ 0.3 We abstract from contract the-
ory by assuming that the manager does not incur disutility by managing her
project. Therefore, there is no adverse selection problem in our model. We make
this assumption because we are interested in exploring the relationship between
ability and risk aversion, and not in the derivation of an optimal contract. We
motivate this assumption by noting that, in the corporate world, managers who
are in position to be promoted to CEO most likely always exert maximum ef-
fort. Hence, we believe that effort will not vary much, if at all, among CEO
candidates.
Managers will choose a mean-volatility pair which will determine the distri-
bution function that characterizes their project’s cash flow. We can interpret this
as being a choice of a specific project from a continuum of available projects with
different parameters, or, equivalently, as an assigned project for which, through
unobserved effort, she is able to affect distribution of her assigned project’s cash
flow. The manager i with risk aversion Ri and ability Ai solves the following
optimization problem:
max
pµi,σiq
Erpiirupw   βXiq   P iCEOs   p1 piiqrupw   βXiqss (2.1)
subject to
$''&
''%
pµi, σiq P T pAiq
Xi  Dpµi, σ2i q
(2.2)
3See Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) for a discussion on linear contracts and the robustness
of their optimality.
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where pii is her prior probability of being promoted to the rank of CEO, P iCEO
is the expected discounted utility of a life-time CEO position, and T pAiq repre-
sents the set of possible mean-volatility pairs given the manager’s ability, Ai.
The technology function, T pAiq, is firm dependent and does not vary across
managers. We also assume that managers have no information with respect to
the characteristics of each other. Hence, each manager will believe they have a
probability pii  pi  1{n of being promoted.
How does the firm select a manager? Three different decision rules appear
to us most plausible:
I. The firm observes a string of different cash flows from the different projects
in which a manager has invested in. From this information, the firm esti-
mates µi for each manager i and selects the manager with the highest µi.
For example, if the firm (or, equivalently, its shareholders) are risk neu-
tral, we know that given a sufficient amount of capital (or, equivalently, no
credit constraints, the firm’s expected profit will be maximized by choosing
the highest µi possible.
II. The firm observes a string of different cash flows from different projects
in which a manager invests in. From this information, the firm estimates
pµi, σiq for each manager i and selects for the manager with the highest
mean-volatility (or Sharpe) ratio, µi
σi
. For example, if the firm’s sharehold-
ers have quadratic utility, the Sharpe ratio will maximize the firm’s value.
Furthermore, Pestien and Sudderth (1988) show that the policy that max-
imizes the firm’s probability of survival is to pick mean and variance to
maximize the equivalent mean-variance ratio.
III. The firm observes a one-shot realization of each manager’s cash flow. The
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firm selects the manager who has the highest realization. Given the dis-
tribution of each manager’s cash flow, we are able to derive the ex ante
probability of a specific manager having a higher return.
We will study the first and the third decision rules. We choose the first de-
cision rule because it allows for the most straightforward way of analyzing the
comparative statics of Ai and Ri with respect to the manager’s optimal mean-
volatility pair. Note that the second decision rule will lead the shareholders to
learn the managers’ types and so will suppress the adverse selection problem.4
For this very reason, this option is not interesting for us.
Furthermore, we study the third option because, in a sense, it is the most
realistic one: observationally, in the business world, we rarely see managers
promoted to C-level positions solely due to the soundness of their decisions.
Instead, these promotions occur due to visible performance, i.e., realized out-
comes. In our context, this implies that the manager will not be selected because
she chose the best mean-volatility pair, but because she achieved the largest
cash flow realization. However, for this case we need to develop an informa-
tion structure in our model and so it would be technically hard to handle this
decision rule.
Since high ability and low risk aversion will constitute desirable traits in our
model, we expect a concave relationship between the two, as depicted in Figure
2.1. This relationship implies some equivalence between managers who have
both a high level of risk aversion and high level of ability type and managers
who have both a low level of risk aversion and low level of ability. We illustrate
4Since the manager’s optimal expected return and standard deviation will be functions of
Ri and Ai, if the firm can learn or accurately estimate these values, and also knows the type of
utility function of the manager, then the firm can back out the managers characteristics.
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Figure 2.1: Set of Possible Managers and Iso-Mean Curves
a set of manager’s coefficients of risk aversion and levels of ability explaining a
given mean of cash flows realizations.
Lastly, we observe that, since the utility function is assumed to be increasing,
it is necessarily increasing in w¯ and in β for a fixed realization of Xi. Hence, we
assume w¯  0 and β  1 without loss of generality.
Given these assumptions, we can rewrite the manager’s objective function
as:
pirupw   βXiq   P iCEOs   p1 piqrupw   βXiqs
 pirupXiq   P iCEOs   p1 piqrupXiqs
 upXiq   piP iCEO (2.3)
Since we assume a fixed probability pi, the manager’s objective function is a
linear transformation of her utility function. This implies that her optimal de-
cisions can be characterized by a standard expected utility maximization prob-
lem, without any consideration for promotion. We are satisfied with this setup
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because our aim is to explore the relationship and interaction between ability
and risk aversion, and not to study scenarios in which the managers have het-
erogeneous preferences over becoming the CEO. This, along with other ideas, is
discussed in the conclusion as a possible extension of our model.
After motivating our assumptions, let us restate and develop the general
optimization problem:
max
pµi,σiq
#
ErupXiqs 
» 8
8
upxqfXipxq dx
+
(2.4)
subject to
$''&
''%
pµi, σiq P T pAiq
Xi  Dpµi, σ2i q
(2.5)
Notice that the objective function, the expected utility of the manager’s cash
flow, is the expected value of a transformed random variable (where the trans-
formation is the utility function, upq. Hence, this maximization problem can be
solved explicitly for random variables such that, when transformed by concave
utility functions, have commonly known (or closed form) probability distribu-
tion functions. In the following section, we examine two such scenarios.
2.3 Specifications
In the subsections to follow we examine two different specifications of this op-
timization problem: (1) the manager has a Constant Absolute Risk Aversion
(CARA) utility function and the random variable Xi follows a normal distri-
bution; and, (2) the manager has a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA)
utility function and the random variable Xi follows a log-normal distribution.
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We solve for these specifications because they are mathematically tractable, and
because they belong to the Hyperbolic Absolute Risk Aversion (HARA) class of
utility functions, which is the most general class of utility functions commonly
used in economic applications with uncertainty. To illustrate the former, we can
transform the expected HARA utility function as follows:
ErupXiqs  E

1Ri
Ri

cXi
1Ri   d

Riﬀ
 1Ri
Ri
E

exp

log

cXi
1Ri   d

Riﬁﬂ
 p1Riq
1Ri
Ri
E

exp

Ri log
 
cXi   dp1Riq
	
 p1Riq
1Ri
Ri
E

exp pRiZiq

 p1Riq
1Ri
Ri
MZpRiq (2.6)
where
MZpRiq 
» 8
8
exppRi  zqfZpzqdz
is the moment generating function of the random variable Zi  logpcXi   dp1
Riqq  Dpµi, σ2i q. This logarithmic relationship is exactly why we proceed to use
normal and log-normal probability distributions over cash flows.
We now proceed to (1) solve for the manager’s maximization problem for
both specifications, and, (2) derive some comparative statics with respect to abil-
ity and risk aversion, and examine how a change in these parameters will affect
the manager’s optimal mean-volatility pair. In Sections 2.4 and 2.5 we will use
these results to analyze the relationship between ability and risk aversion with
respect to winning the tournament under each of the proposed decision rules.
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2.3.1 CARA Preferences/Normal Distribution
Optimal Behavior
In this subsection, we characterize the optimal choice of pµi, σiq as a function of
pRi, Aiq. For this, we first assume that the utility function is of an exponential
form in order to take advantage of its properties (constant relative risk aversion,
CARA). Specifically, the utility function is:
ui pXiq  exp rRiXis
Ri
(2.7)
Each manager’s contract will be defined as a fixed amount plus a frac-
tion of the realized cash flow of her project, which, for the sake of simplicity,
we assume are zero and one respectively. We also assume that the manager
does not derive more utility from being a CEO (or, equivalently, she receives
an additively separable reservation utility normalized to 0). The manager’s
choice set, which is defined by her technology, is described by the following
set: T pAiq 
 @ pµi, σiq P R2   : µi ¤ Ai pσiqα( with α P p0, 1q. For the rest of the
paper, we will refer to the parameter α as the technology level. Given this setup,
the manager’s optimization problem is:
max
pµi,σiqPR2 
E

exp pRiXiq
Ri

(2.8)
subject to
$''&
''%
µi ¤ Ai pσiqα
Xi  N
 
µi, σ
2
i
 (2.9)
Her optimal choice is:5
5See Appendix B.1. for a description of the optimization problem solution.
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µi 

A2i

α
Ri

αﬀ 12α
and σi 

αAi
Ri

 1
2α
(2.10)
Comparative Statics
Let us derive some comparative statics on her optimal decision with respect to
Ai:
Bµi
BAi
 2
2 α

αAi
Ri

 α
2α
¡ 0 and BσiBAi
 1
2 α

αAi
α1
Ri
 1
2α
¡ 0 (2.11)
Since α P p0, 1q, both derivatives are positive: an increase in the manager’s
level of ability will induce a riskier choice with a larger expected return as well
as higher volatility. Performing the same analysis with respect to Ri yields:
Bµi
BRi  
α
2 α

αα

Ai
Ri

2ﬀ 12α
  0
(2.12)
Bσi
BRi  
1
2 α

αAi
R3αi
 1
2α
  0
Similarly, these results show that if the manager’s risk aversion increases,
she will choose a safer project with a lower volatility coupled with a lower ex-
pected return.
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2.3.2 CRRA Preferences/Log-Normal Distribution
Optimal Behavior
Here we follow the same analysis done in the previous subsection but each man-
ager’s preferences are now characterized by a CRRA utility function. Specifi-
cally,
uipXiq  X
1Ri
i
1Ri (2.13)
The rest of the assumptions defined in the previous section remain un-
changed. The manager’s optimization problem is the following:
max
pµi,σiq
E

Xi
1Ri
1Ri
ﬀ
(2.14)
subject to
$''&
''%
µi ¤ Ai pσiqα
log pXiq  N
 
µz, σ
2
z
 (2.15)
Hence, her optimal choice is:6
µi 

 A 2αi
Ri
α
Ri  1
ﬁ
ﬂ
α
2p1αq
and σi 

A2i
Ri
α
Ri  1
ﬀ 1
2p1αq
(2.16)
Comparative Statics
When differentiating the optimal choices of the manager with respect to Ai and
Ri, respectively, we get:
6See Appendix B.2. for a description of the optimization problem solution.
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Bµi
BAi 
1
1 α

A2i
Ri
α
Ri  1
ﬀ α
2p1αq
¡ 0
(2.17)
Bσi
BAi 
1
1 α

 A 2αi
Ri
α
Ri  1
ﬁ
ﬂ
1
2p1αq
¡ 0
As with the CARA case, both derivatives are positive: an increase in the
manager’s level of ability will induce a riskier choice with a larger expected re-
turn. When increasing her level of risk aversion,Ri, we observe that her optimal
choices of µi andσi will decrease:
Bµi
BRi  
1
2

 A2i
Ri
α
Ri  1
	2α
ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬂ
1
2p1αq
  0
(2.18)
Bσi
BRi  
α
2

 A2i
Ri
α
Ri  1
	32α
ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬂ
1
2p1αq
  0
Since both derivatives are negative, we again have the intuitive result that an
increase in the manager’s risk aversion will imply a safer choice with a smaller
expected return.
2.4 Analysis of Decision Rule (I)
Following the first decision rule described in Section 2.2, managers are selected
based on the expected return of their project of choice. This decision rule will
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imply a purely deterministic choice by the firm, since it will not depend on an
observed realization of a random variable. The firm will simply rank the ap-
parent (or estimated) values of µi and select the largest one. The ex post prob-
ability of a manager being promoted is either 1 or 0 (where ex post means after
the manager’s maximization problem is solved). However, we can expand on
the relationship between both parameters with respect to the optimal µi of the
winner of the tournament. We do so for our usual specifications, CARA prefer-
ences/Normal distribution and CRRA preferences/Log-normal distribution.
2.4.1 CARA Preferences/Normal Distribution
We now want to study the relative importance of ability versus risk aversion,
specifically for different levels of technology. One possible hypothesis is the
common perception that ability should be more important when facing a low
level of technology, while risk aversion becomes more important when facing
a high level of technology. Intuitively, this hypothesis is rooted in the idea
that at low levels of technology, the manager must have a high level of abil-
ity for the firm to generate profit, while for high levels of technology the firm
is better off having a sufficiently low level of risk aversion to take advantage of
the high profit projects at its disposal. To study this relationship, let us define
B  max tµiu to be the highest observed choice from the pool of managers. For
our current specification, the relationship between ability and risk aversion is as
follows:
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Figure 2.2: Plot of the Function A(R) - CARA/Normal Specification
max tµiu  B  pAiq
2
2α

α
Ri

 α
2α
ùñ Ai pRiq  B 2α2

Ri
α

α
2
ùñ Ai pRiq9

Ri
α

α
2
, α P p0, 1q
Differentiating Ai pRiq, we get:
BAi pRiq
BRi 
1
2
B
2α
2

Ri
α

α
2
1
¡ 0
B2Ai pRiq
BR2i
 1
4
α  2
α
B
2α
2

Ri
α

α
2
2
  0 (2.19)
Figure 2.2 provides a plot in pR,Aq space of several iso-mean curves for dif-
ferent values of the technological parameter α and for the CARA specification.
The different values of α are: 0.05 (in blue), 0.25 (in red), 0.5 (in green), 0.75 (in
cyan), and 0.95 (in black).
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We see that Ai pRiq is concave with respect to Ri. This implies that there ex-
ists a cutoff point at which ability and risk aversion have the same impact on
managerial decisions, which will be dependent on the given technology param-
eter α. Specifically, at BAipRiqBRi  1, we have Ri  α2
2
α2 . Now, we can examine
the relative importance of ability and risk aversion.
The condition Ri  α2 2α2 implies the existence of a set of values of Ri,
i.e., Ri P

0, α2
2
α2
	
for which a manager’s risk aversion will have a larger im-
pact on mean return than her level of ability, as well as the existence of the set
Ri P

α2
2
α2 , 8
	
where a manager’s ability will have a larger impact on mean
return than her risk aversion. When technology improves pα Ñ 1q, and we re-
strict ourselves to the range of ability-risk aversion pairs for which risk aversion
is relatively more important

BAipRiq
BRi ¡ 1
	
, we find that the level of risk aversion
satisfies Ri   limαÑ1
!
α  2 2α2
)
 1
4
. Similarly, as αÑ 0 and BAipRiqBRi ¡ 1, we find
that Ri   limαÑ 0
!
α  2 2α2
)
 0.
These results indicate that the set of values for which risk aversion is rela-
tively more important than ability expands as αÑ 1 and is equal to 0, 1
4

at the
limit. This set reduces to a null set when α Ñ 0. This matches our ex ante hy-
pothesis of ability being more important for low levels of technology, while risk
aversion plays a larger role when the firm has better technology. Conversely, for
any level of α, if Ri ¡ 14 , the manager’s level of ability will always have a larger
impact on mean return than her level of risk aversion.
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2.4.2 CRRA Preferences/Log-Normal Distribution
Again, let us fix the highest observed choice from the pool of managers as B 
max tµiu, in order to examine the relationship between ability and risk aversion:
max tµiu  B 

 A 2αi
Ri
α
Ri  1
ﬁ
ﬂ
α
2p1αq
ùñ Ai pRiq  B1α

Ri

1
α
 1


 1
ﬀα
2
Ai pRiq9

Ri

1
α
 1


 1
ﬀα
2
, α P p0, 1q ^Ri ¡ α
1 α (2.20)
BAi pRiq
BRi 
1
2
p1 αq

Ri

1
α
 1


 1
ﬀα
2
1
¡ 0
B2Ai pRiq
BR2i
 1
4
pα  2q p1 αq

Ri

1
α
 1


 1
ﬀα
2
2
  0
Figure 2.3 provides a plot in pR,Aq space of several iso-mean curves for dif-
ferent values of the technological parameter α and for the CRRA specification.
As before, the different values of α are: 0.05 (in blue), 0.25 (in red), 0.5 (in green),
0.75 (in cyan), and 0.95 (in black). We can see thatAi pRiq is concave with respect
to Ri. Furthermore, at
BAipRiq
BRi  1 there exists a cutoff point at which ability
and risk aversion have the same impact on managerial decisions. Specifically,
BAipRiq
BRi  1 holds if and only if Ri 

α
1α
	
1   1α
2
 2
2α

. Now, we can exam-
ine the relative importance of ability and risk aversion:
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Figure 2.3: Plot of the Function A(R) - CRRA/Log-Normal Specification
As α Ñ 1, BAipRiqBRi ¥ 1 ðñ Ri   limαÑ1
#
α
1α
	
1   1α
2
 2
2α
+
  8.
Similarly, as αÑ 0, BAipRiqBRi ¥ 1 ðñ Ri   limαÑ0
#
α
1α
	
1   1α
2
 2
2α
+
 0.
These results, together with the constraint Ri ¡ α1α which assures a solution to
the maximization problem, imply that there exists a set of values of Ri, i.e., Ri P
α
1α ,

α
1α
	
1   1α
2
 2
2α

for which a manager’s risk aversion will have a
larger impact on mean return than her level of ability. This set is contracting as
α Ñ 0 and as α Ñ 1 and is equal to a null set at both limits. Finally, another
result of interest is that as α Ñ 0, ability level becomes more important relative
to risk aversion.7
7As αÑ 1, the utility maximization problem does not have a solution in the limit.
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2.5 A Note on Decision Rule (II)
As described in Section 2.2, the second decision rule chosen to select the future
CEO consists simply to select the manager whose project choices (determined
through her optimal mean-volatility pair) yield the highest observed cash flow
realization. Let us proceed to formulate and derive the probability of a given
manager i being promoted.
From our general assumptions, we have that all random variables are inde-
pendent. However, from our results in the previous sections, we know they are
not identically distributed. The key is to notice that, if a manager is promoted
to CEO, it will be because:
X˜i ¡ max
jPt1,...,nu
tX˜ju, j  i (2.21)
Define Xi  maxjPt1,...,nutXju, j  i For the general case pn ¡ 0q, and for
fixed probability distribution parameters (i.e., after the managers make their
optimal choices), manager i will be selected as CEO with a probability:
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pii  P pXi ¡ Xiq  1 P pXi   Xiq  1 P pXi Xi   0q
 1 FXiXip0q
 1
¼
x¤y
fXipxqfXipyq dx dy
 1
» 8
8
fXipxq dx
» 8
x
fXipyq dy
 1
» 8
8
tfXipxq dx  r1 FXipxqsu
 1
» 8
8
fXipxq dx
» 8
8
FXipxqfXipxq dx
ﬀ
 1

1
» 8
8
FXipxqfXipxq dx
ﬀ

» 8
8
FXipxqfXipxq dx
Since we have independence, we can rewrite this as:
pii 
» 8
8
n1¹
ji
FXjpxqfXipxq dx (2.22)
This expression has an intuitive interpretation: since the managers’ cash
flows are independent of each other, the probability of manager i being se-
lected as the new CEO is equivalent to multiplying the probability that manager
i achieves some cash flow a by the probability that the rest of the candidate pool
all achieve cash flows less than a. We integrate over the support of manager i’s
distribution function to account for all possible values of a.
In the following subsections we will discuss two examples: (1) n agents with
uniformly distributed cash flows; and, (2) n ¥ 2 managers with either normal
or log-normally distributed cash flows. We examine the scenario in example (1)
mainly to illustrate the inner workings of the probability formula, while exam-
ple (2) serves as a setup of the general case, as well as an analysis of how ability
61
and risk aversion affect the probability of winning the tournament of a given
manager for n  2.8
2.5.1 N Managers, Uniform Cash Flows
To properly analyze the manager’s optimization problem with uniformly dis-
tributed cash flows, we would need to modify the technology set and the choice
variables of the firm (since the parameters that define a uniform distribution are
its bounds, rather than the mean and variance). Even though we do not make
this explicit modeling change, we can still use the uniform distribution to illus-
trate the intuition of (2.13). We assume that the probability distributions have a
support with the same lower bound a but may have distinct upper bounds bi.
We show that, without loss of generality, if manager i has bi such that bi ¥ bj ,
@j  i, her probability of winning is piin ¥ 1{n:
pii 
» bi
a
n1¹
ji
FXjpxqfXipxq dx

» bi
a
n1¹
ji

x a
bj  a

1
bi  a dx 
1
bi  a
n1¹
ji

1
bj  a
» bi
a
px aqn1 dx
 1
bi  a
n1¸
ji
n1¹
ji

1
bj  a
» bj
a
px aqn1 dx
¡ 1
bi  a
n1¸
1
n1¹
1i

1
bi  a

» bi
a
px aqn1 dx 
n1¹
ji

1
bi  a

 pbi  aqn
n
 1
n
We can also see that if bi  b, @i, pii  1{n. Hence, if the manager had a
mechanism through which she could increase her upper bound on cash flow
8The expression for pˆi, while seemingly straightforward, quickly becomes intractable for val-
ues of n ¡ 2 and non identically distributed variables and can only be handled through numer-
ical simulations.
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bi, such as a higher level of ability, she would increase her probability of being
promoted to CEO.
2.5.2 N Managers, Normal and Log-Normal Cash Flows
Normal Cash Flows
If the cash flows from the managers’ projects are described by a normal ran-
dom variable, we can compute the following probability that manager i will be
promoted:
pii 
» 8
8
n1¹
j
FXjpxqfXnpxq dx

» 8
8
n1¹
j
1
2

1  erf

x µja
2σj2
ﬁﬂ 1
σn
?
2pi
exp

px µ
2
nq
2σ2n

dx (2.23)
Comparative Statics
If managers have CARA utility functions, we can use their optimal choices to
generate some comparative statics. By differentiating with respect to Ai and
Ri, and using the results derived in Subsection 2.3.1: dµidAi ¡ 0,
dµi
dRi
  0, dσi
dAi
¡
0 and dσi
dRi
  0 of the CARA/Normal distribution specification, we derive the
following natural results:
As the level of ability increases, the resulting change in a manager’s proba-
bility of winning the tournament is also positive:
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Bpii
BAi
9 BBAi

 1
σn
?
2pi
exp

px µ
2
nq
2σ2n
¡ 0 (2.24)
If the manager’s risk aversion increases, her probability of winning the tour-
nament will decrease:
Bpii
BRi
9 BBRi

 1
σn
?
2pi
exp

px µ
2
nq
2σ2n
  0 (2.25)
Log-Normal Cash Flows
In the same fashion, if the cash flows from the managers’ projects are described
by a log-normal random variable, the probability that manager i will be pro-
moted will be:
pii 
» 8
8
n1¹
j
FXjpxqfXnpxq dx

» 8
8
n1¹
j
1
2

1  erf

 lnpxq  µjb
2σ2j


ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬂ 1xσn?2pi exp

plnpxq  µ
2
nq
2σ2n

dx
(2.26)
Comparative Statics
Analogously, if we assume all managers have CRRA utility functions, we can
use the comparative statics derived in Subsection 2.3.2: dµi
dAi
¡ 0, dµi
dRi
  0, dσi
dAi
¡ 0
and dσi
dRi
  0 of the CRRA/Log-normal distribution specification. Given these
results, we have that the probability of manager i winning the tournament in-
creases as Ai grows:
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Bpii
BAi
9 BBAi

 1
σn
?
2pi
exp

plnpxq  µ
2
nq
2σ2n
¡ 0 (2.27)
while her probability of winning the tournament decreases as her risk aversion
Ri increases:
Bpii
BRi
9 BBRi

 1
σn
?
2pi
exp

plnpxq  µ
2
nq
2σ2n
  0 (2.28)
For both cases, we can also state that if cash flows are i.i.d. random variables,
we have pii  pˆi  1{n, @i.
2.5.3 N  2 Managers, Normal Cash Flows
To elaborate on the roles that ability and risk aversion play in the probability of
a manager being promoted, let us restrict ourselves to the case n  2: we have
two managers vying for the position of CEO. In this scenario, the probability of,
say, manager 1 being promoted is:
P pX1 ¡ X2q  P pX2 X1   0q  FXp0q (2.29)
where X1  Npµ1, σ21q and X2  Npµ2, σ22 are the random variables that de-
scribe the cash flow of their respective projects. Since both random variables
are normally distributed, X  X2  X1 also follows a normal distribution:
X2  X1  Npµ2  µ1, σ21   σ22q. Hence, we can now write manager 1’s prob-
ability of winning as:
FXp0q  1
2

1  erf

µ2   µ1a
2pσ21   σ22q
ﬁﬂ (2.30)
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Note that, since the error function is positive valued for positive reals,
FXp0q ¡ 1{2 if µ1 ¡ µ2. Hence, manager 1 will be the tournament favorite
if:
µ1 ¡ µ2 ðñ

A21

α
R1

αﬀ 12α
¡

A22

α
R2

αﬀ 12α
ðñ A
2
1
Rα1
¡ A
2
2
Rα2
(2.31)
We observe an, at least, inverse quadratic relationship between ability and
risk aversion. Intuitively, if manager 1’s ability doubles, manager 2’s risk aver-
sion would have to decrease by a factor of 22{α in order to have the same prob-
ability of winning as before the change. Hence, the probability of a given man-
ager winning the tournament is much more sensitive to changes in ability than
it is to changes in risk aversion.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a tournament CEO selection model in which man-
agers vying for the position of CEO are heterogeneous over two dimensions:
ability and risk aversion. We set up the managers’ utility maximization problem
and show that the objective function will be the expected value of the transfor-
mation of the random variable that describes the manager’s cash flow. Further-
more, for utility functions belonging to the HARA class, we can transform the
objective function into a linear function of the moment generating function of
the given random variable. We then solve for two such functions of the HARA
class, CARA (exponential) and CRRA (iso-elastic) utility functions.
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Solving the model for a representative manager’s optimal choice of mean
and volatility reveals the different roles that risk aversion and ability play in
determining the cash flow outcomes. We find closed form expressions for mean
and variance pairs for both CARA and CRRA preferences. These are both in-
creasing in ability and decreasing in risk aversion. Specifically, we show a con-
cave relationship between the two traits. Though the results differ quantita-
tively according to the specific utility function used, some interesting common
patterns arise from the analysis. Namely, the concave relationship between Ai
and Ri holds some important implications for CEO selection. For example, this
relationship implies that, at some levels of Ai and Ri, ability and risk aversion
play equally important roles in determining the winner of the CEO tournament.
Hence, a manager’s level of risk aversion may mask her true ability level. That
is, the outcomes being used to evaluate a manager for the CEO position are not
dictated only by her ability, but are also a result of her risk aversion. In con-
junction with previous studies in the literature that have found that high CEO
risk aversion generates negative returns for the firm, this may indicate that the
firm’s inability to differentiate talent from risk aversion may, at times, lead to
the suboptimal choice of a CEO.
Furthermore, the relative importance of risk aversion with respect to ability
increases as the level of technology increases, and vice versa. This implies that
some industries, or types of firms, will be more sensitive to the CEO’s actual
level of risk aversion and ability than others. That is, the ability to differen-
tiate between the two dimensions of manager quality will be more important
for some firms than for others. This suggests that some firms should be will-
ing to invest more resources into determining ability and risk aversion of CEO
candidates.
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Finally, we also analyze a more realistic decision based solely on observed
cash flow and we are able to derive an expression for the probability of a given
manager winning the tournament and being promoted to CEO. This expression
is a function of her characteristics, as well as of the characteristics of the rest of
the candidate pool. We derive the natural results of her probability of winning
is increasing with respect to ability and decreasing with respect to risk aversion.
This approach seems to be a good starting point for future research: a more so-
phisticated model allowing for a manager to estimate or have prior probabilities
of the other candidates would potentially modify her optimal project choice, es-
pecially if the managers have heterogeneous preferences over being promoted.
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CHAPTER 3
DIVIDEND POLICIES AND FIRM SURVIVAL
3.1 Introduction
In the business world, dividend policies are the result of an enviable situation
for the firm: given a certain level of profits, should it reinvest this windfall back
into the firm, or should it pay out a certain amount to its shareholders? Black
(1976) described this question, and the lack of consensus for a satisfying answer,
as the “dividend puzzle”. He noted that “the harder we look at the dividend
picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, with pieces that just don’t fit together”.
Although this remark was meant to be descriptive at the time, it surprisingly
still holds today – despite the enormous amount of research performed in this
area, there does not yet exist an empirical or theoretical consensus on optimal
dividend policies. The contribution of this paper to this growing literature is
to apply the stochastic dynamic programming techniques developed for solv-
ing optimal consumption and investment problems, especially in Sethi, Taksar
and Presman (1992, 1995) and Presman and Sethi (1996a, b), to the context of a
CEO who determines the dividend payouts of the firm. By utilizing the CEO
tournament results from Chapter 2, this paper studies how the relationship be-
tween the CEO’s ability level and risk aversion affects dividend policies and
firm survival.
As argued previously, I abstract from contract theory by assuming that the
firm offers the new CEO a linear contract. The new CEO essentially becomes a
partner of the firm and receives a certain number of shares.1 These shares pay
1This practice often takes place in large firms, consulting groups, etc. There are two rationales
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out dividends and it is assumed that the CEO cannot sell her shareholdings.2
The selected CEO maximizes the utility of total expected and discounted divi-
dends. The CEO’s utility function is defined by her degree of risk aversion, and
her level of ability will define how much revenue she is able to generate through
her investment decisions. By modifying the Sethi, Taksar and Presman (1992)
model, their results can be reconciled with the model presented in this paper.
Following this analysis, the CEO is then assumed to have CRRA preferences,
which allows for the derivation of optimal dividend and investment policies of
the CEO. I find that CEOs with either high levels of risk aversion and ability or
low levels of these same traits will pay out a low dividend yield, whereas CEOs
with medium ones will pay out a higher dividend yield.
As for the analysis of firm survival, most of the literature concerns itself,
naturally, in modeling and testing the profit maximizing hypothesis. The hy-
pothesis that firms are profit maximizers is obviously pervasive throughout
economics, and the most common argument given for it is a market selection
rationale.3 Nevertheless, it should be noted that the idea that firms are always
profit maximizing, or that long run behavior of the economy is equivalent to
an economy composed solely of profit maximizing firms, has not gone unques-
tioned. Specifically, Dutta and Radner (1999), Koopmans (1957) and Blume and
Easley (2002), suggest otherwise. However, most of the literature assumes, ei-
ther when modeling a manager or CEO that controls the firm or modeling the
firm’s preferences directly, that the firm is risk neutral or that the CEO’s incen-
tives are aligned with those of the shareholders. None of these papers allow
for the CEO’s possible risk aversion to play a role. For instance, Dutta and
for this: retention of the executives and incentives alignment.
2Empirically, it has been observed that equity compensation is primarily composed of re-
stricted stocks that can be sold only after a certain time.
3See Friedman (1953), Alchian (1950) and Nelson & Winter (1982), among others.
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Radner (1999) define the entrepreneur or manager as risk neutral and investi-
gate the profit maximizing assumption. In their continuous-time setting model,
they find that profit maximizing firms fail for sure in finite time, while some
non profit-maximizing strategies for which firms have a positive probability of
surviving do exist. This paper modifies this assumption of risk neutrality by as-
suming a risk averse CEO who controls the policies of the firm. In this context,
I find that the probability of survival, while converging to either zero or one
when risk aversion tends to either zero or infinity, is a non-monotonic function
that will depend on the dividend policy implemented by the CEO.
Finally, Appendix C contains an alternate model of dividend policies and
long-run evolution of the firm following a similar approach used in Dutta and
Radner (1999). Using this modeling technique, I find similar results in that the
CEO dividend policy is concave and non-monotonic with respect to risk aver-
sion.
3.2 General Model
The model presented in this paper is based on the model of optimal invest-
ment and consumption in continuous time developed in Sethi, Taksar and Pres-
man (1992, 1995), which is an extension of Karatzas, Lehoczky, Sethi and Shreve
(1986), which in turn is a generalization of Lehoczky, Sethi and Shreve (1983). I
reinterpret the consumption variable of their models as withdrawals to be paid
out as dividends, and proceed to analyze the optimal decisions and long run
dynamics of the firm. This analysis is performed with respect to one of the main
results in Chapter 2: in the context of a CEO tournament, where the firm does
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Figure 3.1: Heuristic Description of the Model
not have full information over the characteristics of the managers in the can-
didate pool, a concave trade-off between ability and risk aversion is expected.
In other words, it is found that managers of high ability and high risk aversion
may be equally as likely to be promoted as low ability and low risk aversion
managers. However, these combinations of traits may drive distinct dividend
and investment policies, which in turn could affect the firm’s probability of sur-
vival. The setup of the model is as follows: the CEO begins her time at the firm
with an initial amount of capital y. She then continues to run the firm either
over an infinite time horizon or until it goes bankrupt. Figure 3.1 provides a
heuristic description of the model in discrete time.
3.2.1 The CEO’s Decision Problem
The CEO is faced with the decision problem of investing the firm’s capital stock
in two different assets: a riskless asset, with a rate of return r ¡ 0; and a risky
asset, with an expected rate of return αp1   Aq ¡ r. The risky asset’s expected
rate of return, as shown below, is an increasing function of the CEO’s level of
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ability. This setup is deceptively general: Karatzas, Lehoczky, Sethi and Shreve
(1986) show that by making use of the mutual fund theorem (Merton, 1971), a
model with n ¡ 2 risky investments is equivalent to a model with a single risky
asset. The riskless asset is modeled as:
dP0ptq
P0ptq  rdt (3.1)
where P0 is the price of the riskless asset.
The risky investment is described, as in Merton (1971) and Black and Sc-
holes (1973), through what is usually called the ”geometric Brownian motion”
hypothesis. However, the usual formulation is modified to allow for the rate of
return of the risky asset to be a function of the CEO’s ability,A. This formulation
differs slightly from Chapter 2: in this context, low ability cannot diminish the
usual rate of return of the risky asset. In other words, a CEO with zero ability
can expect the minimum expected rate of return α, as shown above, while CEOs
with positive levels of ability will be able to invest in an asset with a higher ex-
pected rate of return. The reason for this assumption will become clear when
defining the CEO’s choice variables. Given this modification, I define the risky
asset in the following manner:
dP ptq
P ptq  αpA  1qdt  σdBptq (3.2)
P is the price of the risky asset. Bpq is a standard Brownian motion, where
standard implies a constant drift of 0 and volatility of 1, while σ ¡ 0 . The
stochastic process that satisfies the Itoˆ stochastic differential equation in (3.2)
follows a geometric Brownian motion.
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The CEO’s preferences are defined by an instantaneous utility function
which is continuously differentiable, strictly concave, strictly increasing and
sublinear:
U : R  Ñ R, U 1pwq ¡ 0, U2pwq   0, @w ¡ 0, and U 1p8q  lim
wÑ8
U 1pwq  0
The CEO’s intertemporal preferences are also defined by her discount rate, β,
which reflects how she will value utility in future periods. Although a specific
utility function is not immediately specified for the general model, when de-
riving the main results I assume that the CEO is characterized by her relative
coefficient of risk aversion, R.
The firm will offer the CEO a contract that is linear with respect to dividends
paid to the shareholders, η   λwpt, P q. In other words, when the manager is
promoted to CEO, she will become a shareholder.4 Again, as in Chapter 2, the
assumptions of η  0 and λ  1 are made. When running the firm, the CEO
chooses an optimal withdrawal policy, wpt, P q, @t ¥ 0, as well as an optimal
investment policy, pipt, P q, @t ¥ 0. The withdrawals wpt, P q will be distributed
amongst the shareholders of the firm. In the model pipt, P q is unconstrained,
which implies unlimited borrowing and short-selling. Note that, due to the
assumption that α ¡ r for all ability levels, short-selling will never occur. How-
ever, the lack of a credit constraint is an obvious limitation of the model, but
one that can be motivated by assuming that the firm is big enough to have sig-
nificant access to capital markets. Another implication of the lack of a credit
constraint is that, when defining ability through the rate of return of the risky
asset, if the CEO’s level of ability is such that it diminishes the baseline rate of re-
4See Section 2.2 of Chapter 2 for a discussion on linear contracts. Also, see Sung (2005) for a
discussion on the optimality of linear contracts in a continuous-time adverse selection model.
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turn, and the CEO has perfect information over her low ability, then the model
allows for generating profits as if the manager had a positive level of ability
by short-selling against the risky asset. Since this unintended mechanism be-
trays the main intention of assuming heterogeneous levels of ability – increased
performance by higher skilled individuals – it is restricted to be only return-
augmenting by assuming the ability parameter to be additively separable from
the base expected return of the risky asset.
As shown in Karatzas, Lehoczky, Sethi and Shreve (1986) and based on Har-
rison and Kreps (1979) and Harrison and Pliska (1981), the firm’s capital stock,
for any given set of policies pwpt, P q, pipt, P qq, will follow the Itoˆ stochastic dif-
ferential equation:
dypt, P q 
$''&
''%
pα  pA  1q  rqpipt, P qypt, P qdt  prypt, P q  wpt, P qqdt
 σypt, P qpipt, P qdBptq
(3.3)
yp0, P q  y (3.4)
One of the main benefits of using the Sethi, Taksar and Presman (1992) model
is that their subsistence constraint, defined as s, such that wpt, P q ¥ s ¥ 0
can be advantageously reinterpreted. Instead of representing subsistence con-
sumption, in this model s will serve as the minimum level of dividends that
the firm needs to pay out to its shareholders.5 To allow for this, two more as-
sumptions over the utility function are needed: Upwq  8 for w   s, and
Upsq  lim
wÑs 
Upwq. These assumptions merely indicate that the utility function
is right-continuous up to w  s, with a jump occurring as soon as dividends
fall below s, where utility drops to 8. In addition, it should be noted that the
5See DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1992) for motivation of sticky dividend policies.
77
case of s  0 is studied by Karatzas, Lehoczky, Sethi and Shreve (1986) and its
solution requires a slightly different than the s ¡ 0 case due to technical mat-
ters. However, since this paper will not delve into the derivations, this will not
affect the concurrent examination of both cases and the subsuquent economic
interpretations.
In order to study the long term effects of the CEO’s optimal policies, the
model also allows for the firm to run out of working capital (i.e., it runs into
bankruptcy). The firm will run into bankruptcy at time T0 if its capital stock
reaches zero at that time. Properly defined,
T0  tsup t ¥ 0 : ypτq  0, @τ P r0, tsu (3.5)
If the firm reaches bankruptcy, the CEO will receive a payment P at the time
of bankruptcy T0. Another useful characteristic of this model is that this pay-
ment can be interpreted as a severance (or penalty) package: if the CEO runs
the firm into bankruptcy, she is fired at time T0 and receives a payment which
provides her utility P . I will use the natural interpretation of P ¡ 0 as a sever-
ance while P   0 will be referred to as a penalty. Additionally, although I will
not make further use of this remark in the rest of the paper, it should be noted
that, for a large enough amount of initial capital y ¡ s{r, since the CEO can
assure a total payout of s in perpetuity by always investing in the riskless asset,
any payment P which provides less than the expected utility of withdrawing
s in perpetuity, i.e., P ¥ Upsq{β, can be labeled as a reward and the reverse,
P   Upsq{β, as a penalty.
Given these assumptions, the CEO’s optimization problem can now be prop-
erly set up as:
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Vwpq,pipqpy, P q  max
wpq,pipq
E
» T0
0
eβtUpwpt, P qqdt  PeβT0
ﬀ
(3.6)
Under some weak conditions on the utility function and on the policies
wpt, P q and pipt, P q to ensure the existence of a solution to Equation (3.2), the
value function can be defined as:6
V py, P q  sup
wpq,pipq
Vwpq,pipqpy, P q (3.7)
As one might expect, the parameter P plays an intricate role in solving this
dynamic programming problem. Before examining the characterizations of the
optimal policies, it is useful to define the following values:
P¯  Up8q
β
and P˜ 
$''&
''%
8, if s ¡ 0
Up0q{β, if s  0
(3.8)
These two values represent important cut-off values in the CEO’s decision.
Specifically, for a large enough reward, P ¥ P¯ , the CEO’s optimal strategy is
to withdraw as much as possible instantaneously in order to reach bankruptcy.7
On the other hand, once the reward is small enough, P   P˜ , or, in other words,
the penalty is large enough, the CEO’s optimal strategy will be the same as if
P  P˜ . Because of these two results, the model can be fully characterized by
focusing on P P rP˜, P¯ q.
Finally, it can be shown that the value function V py, P q satisfies the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
6See Karatzas, Lehoczky, Sethi and Shreve (1986), Sethi, Taksar and Presman (1992) and Pres-
man and Sethi (1996a) for the derivations and proofs of the base model.
7Since the model is in continuous time, she will not be able to withdraw the entire capital
stock instantly and therefore no optimal dividend policy exists.
79
$'''''''''''''''&
'''''''''''''''%
βV py, P q  max
pi,w¥s
$''''''&
''''''%
pαpA  1q  rqpiyV 1py, P q
 pry  wqV 1py, P q
 1
2
pσpiyq2V 2py, P q   Upwq
,//////.
//////-
, if y ¡ 0 and P P rP˜, P¯ q
V p0, P q  P, if y  0 and P P rP˜, P¯ q
lim
yÑ s
r
V py, P˜ q  Upsq
β
, if y Ñ s{r and P  P˜
(3.9)
The solution to the H-J-B equation, the optimal dividend and investment
policies chosen by the CEO, are stated in the next subsection.
3.3 Optimal Dividend and Investment Policies
For a given capital stock ypt, P q at time t, where yp0q  y, the optimal dividend
and investment policies pwpt, P q, pipt, P qq, @t ¥ 0, that the CEO will pursue
are:
wpt, P q 
$''&
''%
pU 1q1V 1py, P q, if 0   V 1py, P q ¤ U 1psq
s, if V 1py, P q ¥ U 1psq
(3.10)
pipt, P qypt, P q  αpA  1q  r
σ2
V 1py, P q
V 2py, pq (3.11)
Following the analysis and summary detailed in Sethi (1998), a synopsis of
my results including the results derived in the previous section for P   P˜ and
P ¡ P¯ can be presented as follows:
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I. For P ¡ P¯ and any capital stock y ¡ 0, the CEO will try to pay out divi-
dends in such a way that bankrupts the firm as quickly as possible.
II. For P P pP˜, P¯ q: The firm will survive with a positive probability q (and,
therefore, will go bankrupt with a positive probability 1 q). This is driven
by the optimal capital stock process, ypt, P q. The probability of survival
will be equal to zero if β ¥ r   γ, where γ  pαpA  1q  rq
2
2σ2
. In other
words, the probability of survival will be zero if the CEO’s discount rate
is high enough. Since γ is a function of the CEO-specific risk premium
αpA   1q  r, for ease of interpretation, γ can be thought of as the risk
premium.
(a) For all P P pP˜, P¯ q, if the Inada condition lim
wÑs
U 1pwq  8 is satisfied, then
the CEO will pay out linear withdrawals with respect to capital stock,
and wpt, P q ¡ s, @t. This last result is driven by the extreme aversion
the CEO will have to paying out only the minimum level of dividends,
s. As noted earlier, this condition can be better interpreted if dividends
are thought of as sticky: once the precedent of paying s is established,
it is very difficult to reduce dividends below this level.
(b) For 0   U 1psq   8, withdrawals will be bounded away from s only if
P is big enough: @s ¡ 0, DP psq such that @P P pP psq, P˜ q, wpt, P q ¡ s.
For the case of P ¤ P psq, Dy¯pt, P q such that, for capital stocks ypt, P q P
r0, y¯pt, P qs, only the minimum dividend is paid out, wpt, P q  s, while
wpt, P q ¡ s when ypt, P q ¡ y¯pt, P q. Hence, dividends are flat at s for
low enough capital stocks, and linear in capital stock when the capital
stock is large enough.
III. For P  P˜ :
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(a) The penalty for bankruptcy is so great that, for a large enough cap-
ital stock of py ¡ s{rq, the firm can and will avoid bankruptcy with
certainty pq  1q, and, if Upsq  8, the CEO will manage the firm
in such a way that the capital stock is bounded below by s{r. The
dividend policy will be defined by U 1psq. If U 1psq  8, the optimal
dividend policy will pay out wpt, P q ¥ s, with equality occurring
when y  s{r. If U 1psq   8, which implies Upsq ¡ 8, then for
y˜psq  lim
PÑP˜ 
y¯pt, P q, withdrawals will be either greater than the mini-
mum, wpt, P q ¡ s, if the capital stock is large enough pypt, P q ¡ y˜psqq,
or will be at the minimum, wpt, P q  s, if the capital stock is small
enough p0   ypt, P q   y˜psqq.
(b) If the capital stock is exactly y  s{r and Upsq ¡ 8, the CEO will pay
out wptq  s in perpetuity by always investing in the riskless asset. In
this scenario, there is no bankruptcy pq  1q.
(c) For any capital stock y P  0, s{r, or for y  s{r and Upsq  8, any
dividend policy the CEO wishes to implement will generate 8 util-
ity. In these scenarios, any dividend policy is optimal and the proba-
bility of survival will be any value q P r0, 1q, depending on the given
withdrawal policy. Intuitively, it should be noted that this case should
not be economically feasible since the firm is almost doomed to fail – a
firm with an initial amount of capital which is less than what is needed
to generate the minimum level of dividends through the riskless as-
set is essentially a inordinately risky gamble. If the recently promoted
manager had the choice between either accepting or rejecting the pro-
motion, she would surely reject it in this scenario.
IV. For P   P˜ and any capital stock y, the CEO will run the firm as if P  P˜ .
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It is interesting to note that, since β is the CEO’s individual discount rate and
r is the market rate of interest, if β  r (the CEO values the future in the same
manner as the market), then the probability of survival is zero only when γ ¤ 0.
Since γ is nonnegative by definition, this means that the firm will fail only in a
scenario where the severance is too large and the CEO’s ability is equal to zero.
In other words, if the set of CEOs with ability equal to zero is a null set, the firm
will have a positive probability of survival in all scenarios. Moreover, it will
only have a positive probability of bankruptcy if P ¡ P˜ . Hence, when β  r,
any failure of the firm can be traced back to CEO impatience, driven by sever-
ance penalties that are too small, or a large discount rate (or both). It should
be noted, however, that, β  r is a perfectly reasonable assumption, and could
be driven by reasons such as pressure from the current board of directors. For
this reason, stating that any failure of the firm must be due to CEO impatience
is potentially too strong of an interpretation of this result.
In the following section I use results (I) through (IV) to analyze how different
CEO types from a given iso-mean curve (as derived in Chapter 2) will behave
and their probability of survival, specifically in the case of CRRA utility.
3.4 CRRA Preferences
To generate the main results of this paper, the CEO’s instantaneous preferences
are assumed to be defined by a Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility
function. Specifically:
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Upwq 
$'''''''&
'''''''%
w1R
1R, if wptq ¥ s and R ¡ 0, R  1
lnpwq, if w ¥ s and R  1
8, if w   s
(3.12)
where, again, the withdrawal constraint with respect to s is implemented by
assuming an infinite disutility over withdrawals less than s .
Given the assumption of a CRRA utility function for the CEO, the following
results can be derived:
I. For all finite values of P , P ¤ P¯  8. Hence, driving the firm into
bankruptcy as soon as possible is never optimal for the CEO.
II. Since s ¡ 0, U 1psq  1
sR
¡ 0, @R ¡ 0. Therefore, for all values of P P pP˜,8q,
the dividend payout will be at least the minimum level s. Furthermore,
@s ¡ 0, DP psq such that for P ¡ P psq, dividends will be bounded away
from s, wptq ¡ s; and, for P ¤ P psq, the will exist a capital level y¯pt, P q,
such that the CEO will only pay the minimum level s if the current capital
stock level is below y¯pt, P q and will pay dividends wpt, P q ¡ s if the capital
stock exceeds this given capital level.
III. If P  P˜  8, the CEO, through her optimal policies, will ensure that
the firm never goes bankrupt for all capital stocks above s{r. In these sce-
narios, there will exist a capital level y˜pt, P q such that the CEO will pay
dividends above s if the capital stock is larger than y˜pt, P q and will pay
exactly s for capital stocks less than y˜pt, P q. Lastly, if the capital stock is be-
low s{r, bankruptcy cannot be avoided with certainty and any policy will
be optimal, with differing probabilities of survival between zero and one.
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Figure 3.2: Dividend Policies and Probability of Survival as a Function of Capi-
tal Stock and Severance.
For ease of understanding, these results are depicted in Figure 3.2.
Furthermore, for the appropriate cases in which the CEO pays out dividends
above s, the dividend and investment policies will be:
wpt, P q 

β  rp1Rq
R
 γp1Rq
R2

ypt, P q (3.13)
pipt, P q  αpA  1q  r
σ2R
(3.14)
Intuitively, the CEO pays out a fraction of the firm’s capital stock in dividends
in each time period, and it also invests a fixed fraction of the capital stock in the
risky asset.
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3.4.1 Dividend Policies
For this subsection, one of the main results from Chapter 2 is imported: it was
found that, in a CEO tournament where the firm does not have a mechanism to
completely disassociate managers’ ability and level of risk aversion, there exists
a trade-off between the two traits which is described by a concave relationship.
This implies that managers with, say, a combination of high ability and high risk
aversion, are as likely to be promoted to CEO as managers with a comparable
combination of low ability and a low level of risk aversion. It should be noted,
however, that only the qualitatively result is implemented, and not the specific
relationships that were found in Chapter 2. This is done for two reasons: (1) the
relationships in Chapter 2 share the concavity property over the specifications
examined, but the functional forms themselves are sensitive to these specifica-
tions; and, (2) the definition of ability in this chapter, although similar in that
it is return-augmenting, is not mathematically equivalent to the one in Chapter
2 due to the modifications made to accommodate the lack of credit constraints
of the current model. Hence, I assume that the concave relationship is simply
defined by the function A  gpRq, where g1pRq ¡ 0 and g2pRq   0.
Notice that the dividend policy is a function of γ, which in turn now is a
function of R. If γ and A  gpRq is substituted into (3.13), the following expres-
sion can be derived:
wpt, P q 

β  rp1Rq
R
 γp1Rq
R2

ypt, P q


β  rp1Rq
R
 pαpA  1q  rq
2
2σ2
1R
R2
ﬀ
ypt, P q


β  rp1Rq
R
 pαpgpRq   1q  rq
2
2σ2
1R
R2
ﬀ
ypt, P q (3.15)
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From this point onwards, the analysis is focused on the dividend yield, which
shall be referred to as θ, as opposed to total dividends. It is simply the fraction
of the capital stock which is paid to the shareholders, and mathematically it is
the linear coefficient in Equation (3.15):
θ  β  rp1Rq
R
 pαpgpRq   1q  rq
2
2σ2
1R
R2
(3.16)
First, I find that, for all functions gpRq, the dividend yield is a concave func-
tion for all values of R. Furthermore, it will have a maximum for all functions
gpRq with degree lower or equal to 1{2. From this result I hypothesize that the
trade-off between ability must be large enough, for if it is too small, at the limit
when risk aversion goes to infinity, ability will increase at a fast enough rate
that expected returns will outpace the increased risk aversion and the dividend
yield will diverge to infinity. Mathematically:
lim
RÑ8
θ  r   α
2
2σ2
 lim
RÑ8
gpRq2
R
(3.17)
Hence, assuming that gpRq is of degree 1{2 or lower, managers on the same
iso-mean curve, i.e., who have the same likelihood of being promoted to CEO
per Chapter 2’s results, will have different dividend policies. The managers
with high ability and, by extension, high risk aversion, as well as the managers
with low ability but low risk aversion, will have lower dividend yields then
managers with a combination of medium levels of ability and risk aversion.
Figure 3.3, which was plotted using the values β  0.5, r  1, α  1.4, σ  1
and the function gpRq  ?R, illustrates this result.
However, by further interpreting these results, it can be observed that for
high levels of ability and their corresponding higher levels of risk aversion, the
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Figure 3.3: Optimal Dividend Yields as a Function of Risk Aversion for Likely
CEOs.
total dividends paid out to the shareholders does not necessarily decline. Since
total dividends is equal to the dividend yield times the capital stock, the change
in capital stock as ability increases needs to be taken into account as well. To
address this, notice how the capital stock equation changes: for a given level
of capital, an infinitesimal change for a change in risk aversion will result in a
change in the the expected rate of return, which in turn affects the fraction of
capital which is invested in the risky asset, as well as a change in the dividend
yield. When risk aversion tends to infinity, the fraction invested in the risky
asset converges to zero, while, at the same time, dividends will necessarily be s.
Hence, at the limit, the CEO will run the firm as if it had the smallest amount of
capital possible to survive ps{rq. Analogously, when risk aversion tends to zero,
the fraction of capital invested in the risky asset tends to infinity (the CEO would
borrow an infinite amount of money), but withdrawals would also only be s. It
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is obvious that these scenarios would not be optimal for the shareholders of the
firm – they would much prefer a CEO with a more balanced portfolio choice.
3.5 A Note on Firm Survival
As noted in the introduction, though the model presented in this paper is based
on the optimal consumption and investment literature, the main inspirations
were the ideas of market selection and firm survival in Dutta and Radner (1999)
and Blume and Easley (2002). Conveniently, another characteristic of adapting
the Sethi, Taksar and Presman (1992) model is that the probability of survival
(or, equivalently, the probability of bankruptcy) of the firm can also be analyzed.
Presman and Sethi (1996b) provide a closed-form solution, as a function of the
first and second derivatives of the value function, of the probability of survival:
P pT0  8q 
$''''&
''''%
1

V 1py, P q
V 1ps{r, P q

 r γβ
γ
,
if r   γ  β ¡ 0
0, if r   γ  β ¤ 0
(3.18)
Again, the relevant comparison is to contrast potential CEOs who belong
to the same iso-mean curve, or are equally as likely to be promoted to CEO.
Hence, two different CEOs with coefficients of relative risk aversion R1 and R2,
and corresponding levels of ability A1  gpR1q and A2  gpR2q are assumed,
where, without loss of generality, R1 ¡ R2, which implies that A1 ¡ A2. Both
CEOs are assumed to be running a firm with the same amount of initial capital
y, and will receive the same severance P if the firm falls into bankruptcy. Since
V and γ are functions of both ability and risk aversion, when comparing the
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CEOs probabilities of survival, the CEO with R1 will have a larger probability
of survival if:
1

V 11py, P q
V 11ps{r, P q

 r γ1β
γ1 ¡ 1

V 12py, P q
V 12ps{r, P q

 r γ2β
γ2
(3.19)
Since the value function, forR  1, is right continuous at s{r and V ps{r, P q 
Upsq{β, it can be easily shown that the value function for CRRA utility will be:
V py, P q  y
1R
1R

β  rp1Rq
R
 γp1Rq
R2
R
 y
1R
1Rθ
R,
which allows Equation (3.19) to be simplified as:

β

s
r
1
yθ2

R2ﬀ r γ2βγ2
¡

β

s
r
1
yθ1

R1ﬀ r γ1βγ1
(3.20)
Equation (3.20) demonstrates that the probability of survival with respect to
R is a function of θ, the optimal dividend yield. Since θ, as shown in the previ-
ous subsection, is not monotonic with respect to R, neither is the probability of
survival. Hence, which CEO will have the larger likelihood of surviving cannot
be algebraically determined. It can be noted, however, that the following intu-
itive results indeed hold: as R Ñ 8, the probability of survival of the firm is 1,
and as RÑ 0, the probability of survival is 0.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I provide an application of the optimal consumption and invest-
ment models from the operations research literature to model the effects of CEO
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characteristics on optimal dividend policies and long run dynamics of the firm.
The main reason for adopting a modified version of the Sethi, Taksar and Pres-
man (1992, 1995) model is to take advantage of the closed form solutions they
were able to derive for very general formulations of investment-consumption
models. Assuming managers are heterogeneous with respect to risk aversion
and levels of ability, the optimal dividend and investment policies of the CEO
can be fully characterized and shown to be functions of her ability and risk
aversion. I import one of the main results of Chapter 2: there exists a con-
cave relationship between ability and risk aversion in terms of the likelihood of
a given manager being promoted to CEO. Although this result is only imple-
mented qualitatively, when assuming that the CEO is characterized by a CRRA
utility function, the optimal dividend policy of the CEO can be shown to vary
non-monotonically with respect to risk aversion. Specifically, CEOs with combi-
nations of either high ability and risk aversion, or low ability and risk aversion,
will implement dividend policies with a lower yield than CEOs with a more
balanced combination of ability and risk aversion.
Furthermore, by implementing the results of Presman and Sethi (1996b), the
probability of survival of the firm given a type of CEO can be defined and ex-
plored in detail. I find that the probability of survival is a function of the optimal
dividend yield of a given CEO, and this function is not monotonic. Specifically,
there exists a range of risk aversion coefficients for which the risk-averse behav-
ior of the CEO counteracts a potentially higher dividend yield, and the resulting
change in the probability of survival is ambiguous. However, the following nat-
ural results are verified: as risk aversion (and, by extension, ability) converges to
either zero or infinity, the probability of survival of the firm converges to either
zero or one, respectively.
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Finally, in Appendix C, I include a continuous-time model a´ la Dutta and
Radner (1999) which also uses the risk aversion-solution set solution set previ-
ously found in Chapter 2, and in this context the optimal dividend policy can
again be characterized in terms of levels of risk aversion and ability. Assum-
ing CRRA preferences and defining cash flow as a geometric Brownian motion,
the same result as in the paper is found: CEOs with levels of risk aversion and
ability either both high or both low will pay out a low dividend yield, whereas
CEOs with medium ones will pay out a high dividend yield.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1
A.1 Adverse Selection Design a` la Macho-Stadler and Pe´rez-
Castrillo
A.1.1 Firm Behavior
Firms will maximize profits given their characteristics and what contract they
are being offered: the regulator observes β˜ and θ˜ and offers a menu of contracts 
pf , R

The firms’ maximization problem will be:
max
pβ˜,θ˜qP
¯
β,β¯

r¯θ,θ¯s
#
paA

R

β˜, θ˜
	

  pf

β˜, θ˜
	
 F

R

β˜, θ˜
	
, β˜

+
(A.1)
For tractability purposes, we will further simplify this problem to
max
γ˜P

¯
γ,γ¯

"
paγ

R¯  v  R pγ˜q	  T pγ˜q* (A.2)
where v pq is an increasing and convex function, which represents the efficiency
of the land to be fallowed/sequester carbon/used to produce carbon offsets,
and γ  θ
β˜
, is the collapsed, relative benefit of producing agriculture as opposed
to offsets.
Note that for the contract menu to make sense, the regulator must be sure
that a type-γ agent will be interested in accepting the contract
 
R pγq , T pγq,
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instead of untruthfully declaring herself a typeγ˜ in order to sign the contract 
R pγ˜q , T pγ˜q. This is what is referred to as the incentive compatibility condition
pICq and we can write it as:
paγ

R¯  v  R pγq	  T pγq ¥ paγ R¯  v  R pγ˜q	  T pγ˜q
ðñ T pγq  paγv
 
R pγq ¥ T pγ˜q  paγv  R pγ˜q (A.3)
Also, in order for the firm to accept the contract, it must receive at least
the reservation utility. This is known as satisfying the individual rationality
condition pIRq. In our case, this is derived from allocating the entire plot of
land towards agriculture:
paγ

R¯  v  R pγq	  T pγq ¥ max  paγR¯, 0(
ðñ T pγq  paγv
 
R pγq ¥ 0, if γ ¥ 0
T pγq  paγv
 
R pγq ¥ paγR¯, if γ   0 (A.4)
For both scenarios, we can see that the right hand side of the inequalities are
constant. We will solve for both cases separately.
A.1.2 Regulator
Thanks to the revelation principle, we can concentrate on “point contracts”,
given that the corresponding incentive compatible constraints hold. The op-
timization problem then becomes:
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max
Rpγq, T pγq
» γ¯
¯
γ

Π
 
R pγq T pγq f pγq dγ
subject to$'''''&
'''''%
pIR1q T pγq  paγv
 
R pγq ¥ 0 for all γ P r0, γ¯s
pIR2q T pγq  paγv
 
R pγq ¥ paγR¯ for all γ P 
¯
γ, 0

pICq T pγq  paγv
 
R pγq ¥ T pγ˜q  paγv  R pγ˜q for all γ, γ˜ P 
¯
γ, γ¯

As noted in Macho-Stadler and Pe´rez-Castrillo, this problem has some special
characteristics. The following properties are important for the solution:
I. The Spence–Mirrlees (single crossing) condition: BBγ

Bpi{BR
Bpi{BT
	
 BBγ

paγv1pRq
1
	

pav1 pRq   0.
II. We can divide the problem into two stages:
(a) First, for each R pγq that the regulator wants the firm to use, she must
find the transfer T pγq that ensures that each agent type will effectively
choose that contract
 
R pγq , T pγq.
(b) Second, between all the functions R pγq for which a transfer function
T pγq can be found, the regulator must choose that which maximizes
expected welfare. Since the function satisfies the S-M condition, the
only way in which the regulator can implement a particular land re-
quirement R pγq is if the function satisfies the condition dR
dγ
¤ 0. Hence,
land required for offsets is decreasing in γ (increasing in relative effi-
ciency for offsets).
III. Only the individual rationality constraint of the least efficient type is
needed. If this one is satisfied, all individual rationality constraints for
more efficient types are automatically satisfied:
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T pγq  paγv
 
R pγq ¥ T pγ¯q  paγv  R pγ¯q ¥ T pγ¯q  paγ¯v  R pγ¯q ¥ 0
IV. The incentive compatibility constraint can be transformed in the following
manner:
pi pγq  max
γo
!
T pγoq  paγv
 
R pγoq)  T pγq  paγv  R pγq
By the envelope theorem, we know that dpipγq
dγ
 pav
 
R pγq. Hence, pi pγq
can be written as:
pi pγq  pi pγ¯q  
» γ
γ¯
dpi pxq
dx
dx  pi pγ¯q  
» γ¯
γ
pav
 
R pxq dx (A.5)
Given that the participation constraint for γ¯ must be satisfied, we have
pi pγq  T pγq  paγv
 
R pγq  U¯   » γ¯
γ
pav
 
R pxq dx (A.6)
where U¯ 
$'&
'%
0, if γ ¥ 0
paγR¯, if γ   0
The proof required to show R pγq is implementable if and only if it is not in-
creasing in γ is omitted. Since our last expression implies that the participation
constraint for γ¯ is satisfied, we can rewrite the regulators problem as:
max
Rpγq,T pγq
» γ¯
¯
γ

Π
 
R pγq T pγq f pγq dγ (A.7)
subject to
$'''&
'''%
dR pγq
dγ
¤ 0
T pγq  paγv
 
R pγq  » γ¯
γ
pav
 
R pxq dx  U¯ (A.8)
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where, again, U¯ 
$'&
'%
0, if γ ¥ 0
paγR¯, if γ   0
By substituting T pγq into the objective function, we get
max
Rpγq
» γ¯
¯
γ

Π
 
R pγq paγv  R pγq
» γ¯
γ
pav
 
R pxq dx U¯
ﬀ
f pγq dγ (A.9)
subject to
dR pγq
dγ
¤ 0 (A.10)
Assuming the constraint is satisfied, we integrate by parts to arrive at:
» γ¯
¯
γ
» γ¯
γ
pav
 
R pxq dxfpγq dγ


F pγq
» γ¯
γ
pav
 
R pxq dx
ﬀγ¯
¯
γ

» γ¯
¯
γ
pav
 
R pxqF pγq dγ
 
» γ¯
¯
γ
pav
 
R pxqF pγq dγ   » γ¯
¯
γ
pav
 
R pxq F pγq
f pγq f pγq dγ
Substituting in the regulators problem gives us
$&
%maxRpγq
» γ¯
¯
γ

Π
 
R pγq pav  R pγq

γ   F pγq
f pγq


 U¯
ﬀ
f pγq dγ (A.11)
The FOC of this problem is:
Π1
 
R pγq pav1  R pγq

γ   F pγq
f pγq


 0 ùñ v1  R pγq  Π1
 
R pγq
γ   F pγq
fpγq
(A.12)
Furthermore, if we define Π
 
R pγq  paγ R¯  v  R pγq	  peR pγq we have
v1
 
R pγq  pe  paγv1
 
R pγq
γ   F pγq
fpγq
(A.13)
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For a uniform distribution, we have
v1
 
R pγq  pe  paγv1
 
R pγq
2γ 
¯
γ
(A.14)
Compare to the result with full information, which should be:
v1
 
R pγq  pe  paγv1
 
R pγq
γ
(A.15)
From this we can determine that under asymmetric information, while there
is no “distortion at the top”, i.e., for
¯
γ the results are the same. However, for
every other value of γ we have reduced efficiency in that the regulator demands
less land for offsets under adverse selection.
Also, note that putting some structure over v pqwould allow us to determine
R pγq, which in turn would allow us to determine T pγq (through the incentive
compatibility condition). This fully characterizes the contract.
Finally, dRpγq
dγ
¤ 0 holds if and only if

Π2
 
R pγq pav2  R pγq

γ   F pγq
f pγq

ﬀ
dR pγq
dγ
pav1
 
R pγq1  d
dγ
F pγq
f pγq


 0 (A.16)
Note that, since the SOC of the regulators problem is satisfied:
Π2
 
R pγq pav2  R pγq

γ   F pγq
f pγq


  0
we have
dR pγq
dγ
¤ 0 ðñ 1  d
dγ
F pγq
f pγq ¥ 0
ðñ d
dγ
F pγq
f pγq ¥ 1
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which is a property satisfied by several distributions (including the uniform).
Let us see what this contract looks like by using functional forms. Specifi-
cally, if we assume the land production function vpq to be v pRq  ?R, we have
that v1 pRq  1
2
?
R
, and
1
2
a
R pγq 
pe  paγ 1
2
?
Rpγq
2γ 
¯
γ
R pγq 

p2  paq γ 
¯
γ
2pe
ﬀ2
(A.17)
Now,
T pγq  paγlnR pγq   pa
» γ¯
γ
v
 
R pxq dx  U¯ (A.18)
Integrating by parts:
» γ¯
γ
v
 
R pxq dx  » γ¯
γ
ln

p2  paqx
¯
γ
pe

dx



x ¯
γ
2  pa


ln

p2  paqx
¯
γ
pe

 x

γ¯
γ


γ¯  ¯
γ
2  pa


ln

p2  paq γ¯ 
¯
γ
pe

 γ¯  γlnR pγq
 

¯
γ
2  pa


lnR pγq   γ (A.19)
Substituting Equation (A.19) into Equation (A.18) results in:
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T pγq  paγ
a
R pγq   pa
» γ¯
γ
v
 
R pxq dx  U¯
 paγ¯

p2  paq γ 
¯
γ
2pe
ﬀ
  pa pγ¯  γq

p2  paq pγ¯   γq  2
¯
γ
4pe
ﬀ
  U¯
 2pa
p2  paq
2pe

2γ¯γ   pγ¯  γq pγ¯   γq 
¯
γγ

  U¯ (A.20)
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2
In this Appendix, we provide the details on how to derive the optimization
solutions for the CARA/Normal and CRRA/Log-Normal specifications for the
CEO Selection Model in Chapter 2.
B.1 Solution for CARA/Normal Distribution Specification
max
pµi,σiq
E

exp pRi Xq
Ri

(B.1)
subject to
$'&
'%
µi ¤ Ai  pσiqα
X  N  µi, σ2i  (B.2)
Let Yi  Ri  X . Since Yi is a linear transformation of X , we know that Yi
also follows a normal distribution, i.e., Yi  N
 Riµi, R2iσ2i . Then, our opti-
mization problem is equivalent to:
min
pµi,σiq
1
Ri
E

exp pY q (B.3)
subject to
$'&
'%
µi ¤ Ai  pσiqα
Yi  N
 Riµi, R2iσ2i  (B.4)
We also know that if Yi is normally distributed, then exp pYiq follows a log-
normal distribution: exp pYiq  logN
 Riµi, R2iσ2i . This allows us to further
simplify our optimization problem:
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min
pµi,σiq
1
Ri

exp

Riµi   R
2
iσ
2
i
2
ﬁﬂ (B.5)
subject to µi ¤ Ai  pσiqα (B.6)
which is equivalent to:
max
pµi,σiq
#
Riµi  R
2
iσ
2
i
2
+
(B.7)
subject to µi ¤ Ai  pσiqα (B.8)
The technology constraint will bind at the optimum pµi  Ai  σαi q. The
objective function will be strictly concave (an inverted parabola) with respect
to σi. Hence, the first-order condition is necessary and sufficient to characterize
the solution:
B

RiAi  σαi  R
2
i σ
2
i
2
	
B pσiq  αRiAi  σ
α1
i R2iσi  0 (B.9)
Solving for µi and σi:
σi 

αAi
Ri

 1
2α
(B.10)
µi  pAiq
2
2α

α
Ri

 α
2α
(B.11)
B.2 Solution for CRRA/Log-Normal Distribution Specification
max
pµi,σiq
E

X1Ri
1Ri
ﬀ
(B.12)
subject to
$'&
'%
µi ¤ Ai  pσiqα
log pXq  N  µz, σ2z (B.13)
106
where µi and σi are the mean and variance of the log-normally distributed ran-
dom variable X . We can manipulate the expected utility function to get a more
manageable optimization problem:
E

X1Ri
1Ri
ﬀ
 1
1RiE

exp log

X1Ri
	
 1
1RiE

exp
 p1Riq log pXq(
 1
1RiMz p1Riq
 1
1Ri exp

µz p1Riq   σ
2
z p1Riq2
2
ﬀ
 1
1Ri
$&
%exp

µz   σ
2
z p1Riq
2
ﬀ,.
-
1Ri
where Mz pq is the moment generating function of z.
Since the manager is choosing between mean-variance pairs for cash flow
pµi, σiq, we need to express µz and σz in terms of pµi, σiq, or equivalently, in
terms of
 
µi, σ
2
i

. From z  N  µz, σ2z , X  exp pzq  logN  µz, σ2z we have:
µi  exp

µz   σ
2
z
2

σ2i 

exp
 
σ2z
 1 exp  2µz   σ2z
Solving this system for µz and σ2z results in:
µz  log

 µ2i 
σ2i   µ2i
 1
2
ﬁ
ﬂ
σ2z  log

σ2i   µ2i
µ2i
ﬀ
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which implies
E

X1Ri
1Ri
ﬀ
 1
1Ri
$'&
'%exp

log

 µ2i 
σ2i   µ2i
 1
2
ﬁ
ﬂ  1Ri
2


log

σ2i   µ2i
µ2i
ﬀﬁﬃﬂ
,/.
/-
1Ri
 1
1Ri
#
exp

p1 Riq log pµiq  Ri
2
log
 
σ2i   µ2i
+1Ri
 1
1Ri
$&
% µ
1 Ri
i 
σ2i   µ2i
Ri
2
,.
-
1Ri
Now, after a monotone increasing transformation on this objective function,
we can solve an equivalent maximization problem:
max
pµi,σiq
$&
% µ
2
Ri
 2
i
σ2i   µ2i
,.
- (B.14)
subject to µi ¤ Ai  σαi (B.15)
Since the technology constraint binds at the optimum pµi  Ai  σαi q, we have:
max
µi
$'''&
'''%
µ
2
Ri
i
µ
2
α p1αq
i
pAiq
2
α
  1
,///.
///-
(B.16)
If α and Ri satisfy the additional constraint Ri ¡ α1α , the objective function
will be strictly concave over µi ¥ 0. Hence, the first-order condition is necessary
and sufficient to characterize the solution:
B
Bµi

µ 2Rii

µ 2α p1αqi
pAiq
2
α
  1


1ﬁﬃﬂ 
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 2µ
2
Ri
1
i
Ri

µ
2
α p1αq
i
pAiq
2
α
  1
ﬀ  µ
2
Ri
i
µ
2
α p1αq
i
pAiq
2
α
  1
ﬀ2

2 p1 αq
αA
2
α
i
µ
2
α
3
i

 0 (B.17)
From this condition, the closed-form expression for µi can be found:
ðñ µ
2
α
p1αq
i 
α

A
2
α
i   µ
2
α
p1αq
i

p1 αqRi
ðñ µ
2
α
p1αq
i

Ri
α
Ri  1

 A
2
α
i
ðñ µi 

 A 2αi
Ri
α
Ri  1
ﬁ
ﬂ
α
2p1αq
(B.18)
Finally, by plugging in Equation (B.18) into the binding technology con-
straint (Equation B.15), the solution for σi can be derived:
σi 

 Ai
Ri
α
Ri  1
	 1
2
ﬁ
ﬃﬃﬂ
1
1α
(B.19)
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APPENDIX C
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3
C.1 General Model a` la Dutta and Radner (1999)
Firm behavior is modeled in continuous time to study its optimal dividend pol-
icy and implications on survival. The earnings or cash flow process of the firm
is modeled as a controlled diffusion which the CEO controls through a mean-
variance framework and through which her level of ability will also play a role.
Specifically, the CEO chooses zptq 

m
 
Y ptq, A , s  Y ptq, A P Z  Y ptq, A,
where m ptq and s ptq are the drift and the volatility of a given project, A is her
personal level of ability and Y ptq is her capital stock at time t (the firm starts at
period t  0 with an initial capital stock Y p0q  y ¡ 0). With this definition it
is implicitly assumed that the optimal controls are stationary. This means that
zptq  zpt1q, @t,t1 P R  , t  t1 ðñ Y ptq  Y pt1q.
The cash flows stochastic process of the firm is defined as follows: Let F pq be
a filtration generated by a standard Brownian motion Bpq. Xptq is the solution,
adapted to F pq, of the stochastic differential equation:
dX ptq 
$'&
'%
m
 
X ptq , t dt  s 12  X ptq , t dB ptq , 0   t   T
0, t ¡ T
(C.1)
where T is the “stopping” time or the first t at which accumulated cash flow
reaches zero, i.e., XpT q  0. T is defined as the moment when the firm becomes
bankrupt. Note that T does not necessarily have to be finite. If cash flow never
reaches zero, then T  8. Also, the starting point of the cash flow is defined as
the initial capital stock y: Xp0q  y.
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The capital stock flow equation at time t is given by dY ptq  dXptq  wptqdt,
where wptq represents instantaneous dividends paid out to investors at time t.
This implies that the capital stock flow equation can be expressed as:
dY ptq 
$''&
''%

m
 
X ptq , t w ptq dt  s 12  X ptq , t dB ptq , for 0   t   T
0, for t ¡ T
W ptq 
» t
0
wpuqdu represents accumulated dividends paid out up until time t.
Assuming there exists a solution that satisfies Equation C.1, it is also known that
W ptq ¤ y  Xptq, @t.
The CEO maximizes her expected utility:
max
W ptq¤y Xptq
V pyq  E
» T
0
ertu pw¯   βwtq dt | Y p0q  y
ﬀ
(C.2)
subject to
$'''&
'''%
dY ptq  rmpXptq, tq  wptqsdt  s 12 pXptq, tqdBptq
W ptq 
» t
0
wpuqdu^ rmptq, sptqs P ZpY ptq, Aq
(C.3)
where r ¡ 0 is an exogenously given market interest rate.
C.1.1 Assumptions about Technology
Through these assumptions I model how the entrepreneur controls the cash
flow process. Here is where the ability of a certain type of CEO will matter:
all else equal, CEO’s with higher ability will have a larger choice set than CEO’s
with lower ability. Hence, if every parameter in the model is fixed except abil-
ity, a CEO with higher ability will perform at least as well as a CEO with lower
ability. Formally, these assumptions are:
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1. Z is compact-valued and has a non-empty intersection:

Z
 
Y ptq , A 
H ðñ Dpm, sq P ZpY ptq, Aq, @t, A.
2. Investment is inherently risky: @pm, sq P ZpY ptq, Aq, s ¡ 0, @Y ptq P
R , @t, A.
3. Decreasing returns with respect to capital: Define mpy, Aq  maxtm |
pm, sq P ZpY ptq, Aqu. This means that, given r, mpy   εq   mpyq   rε.
4. ZpY ptq, Aq is monotone increasing with respect to Y ptq and A: y1   y2 ùñ
Z
 
y1, A¯
  Z  y2, A¯ and A1   A2 ùñ Z py¯, A1q  Z py¯, A2q.
C.2 CRRA Preferences/Geometric Brownian Motion Specifica-
tion
For this section, I assume the CEO is characterized by a CRRA utility function
u pwq  w1R
1R and a technology set where she does not directly control the cash
flow process, i.e., Z
 
Y ptq , A  Z   mAY ptq, sY ptq2, where pm, sq is a fixed
drift-volatility pair. The CEO does, however, control the cash flow process indi-
rectly: her choice of w ptq at time t will influence the capital stock at time t   ε.1
Since pm, sq is fixed, the stochastic process that describes cash flow reduces to a
geometric Brownian motion:
dX ptq  m  X ptq , t dt  s 12  X ptq , t dB ptq  mAX ptq dt  s 12X ptq dB ptq
1Radner and Shepp (1996) argue that describing firm profits with the multiplicative Black
and Scholes (1972) model, which is equivalent to our geometric Brownian motion specification,
is inappropiate for an individual firm. However, their reasoning follows from the fact that they
assume risk neutrality for the firm, which would imply constant returns to scale profits. In this
model, given the risk averse nature of the CEO, this issue need not be addressed.
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which is a stochastic differential equation with solution:
X ptq  y exp

s
1
2B ptq  

mA 1
2
s


t
ﬀ
From this solution, the dynamics of the firm’s capital stock can be expressed as:
dY ptq  mAY ptqdt  s1{2Y ptqdB ptq  wptqdt
Then, the CEO is faced with choosing a dividend stream that maximizes her
expected utility function. Applying the same simplifications as in the previous
section (namely, w¯  0 and β  1), the CEO will maximize the expected utility
of total discounted dividends:
max
W ptq
V pyq  E
» T
0
exp prtqu pwtq dt | Y p0q  y
ﬀ
(C.4)
subject to
$''&
''%
dY ptq  mAY ptqdt  s1{2Y ptqdB ptq  wptqdt
W ptq  ³t
0
w puq du
(C.5)
In order to solve this problem, the optimal dividend policy is assumed (and
later proven) to be of the form: wpY ptqq  θY ptq. Now, a solution for θ is needed.
First, the capital stock dynamics can be rewritten as:
dY  mAY ptqdt  s1{2Y ptqdB ptq  wpY ptqq
 mAY ptqdt  s1{2Y ptqdB ptq  θY ptq
 pmA θqY ptqdt  s1{2Y ptqdB ptq
Since the dividend policy is proportional to firm’s capital, instantaneous with-
drawals can be expressed as:
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dw  pmA θqwptqdt  s1{2wptqdB ptq
λ is defined as the shadow price of the initial capital stock, y:
λ  dV pyq
dy
By the FOC, it must be that:
λ  dupwq
dw
 wR
Next, by applying Ito’s Lemma:
dλ  Rw1Rdw   1
2
Rp1 Rqw2Rdw2
Moreover, since:
Etdw  pmA θqwptqdt
and:
dw2  swptq2dt
The dynamics of the shadow price can be expressed as:
Etdλ
dt
 Rw1Rppθ mAq   1
2
p1 Rqsq
However, this expression can be transformed in the following fashion:
Etdλ
dt
 λpr  pmARsqq
 wRpr  pmARsqq
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Figure C.1: Plot of the Optimal Dividend Policy
Reconciling the two previous equations, at the optimum the following condition
must hold:
Rppθ mAq   1
2
p1 Rqsq  pr  pmARsqq
Finally, solving for θ:
θ  mA mA r
R
  1R
2
s (C.6)
This fully characterizes the optimal withdrawal policy. In terms of instanta-
neous dividends:
w ptq 

mA mA r
R
  1R
2
s

Y ptq (C.7)
Given a specific solution set pR,Aq, Figure C.1 illustrates the optimal divi-
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Figure C.2: Plot of a Sample Path for Capital Stock
dend policy in function of the CEO’s coefficient of relative risk aversion, R. In
this example the drift, m, the volatility, s, the technology parameter, α, and the
interest rate, r, are equal to 0.1, 0.1, 0.5 and 0.05 respectively. The figure shows
that CEOs with levels of risk aversion and ability either both high or low should
payout a low dividend yield, whereas CEOs with medium ones should payout
a high dividend yield.
Figure C.2 provides a sample path of the capital stock, Y ptq, given that firm’s
cash flows follow a geometric Brownian motion and that the CEO applies the
optimal dividend policy. The firm goes bankrupt when its capital stock falls
below zero.
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